https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/18/world/europe/russia-nato.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article
Russia Breaks Diplomatic Ties With NATO
Moscow’s decision to end its diplomatic mission to the alliance will end a long, post-Cold War experiment in building trust between militaries.
MOSCOW — Russia plans to cease its diplomatic engagement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Russian foreign minister said on Monday, in the latest sign of unraveling relations between Moscow and the West.
Though significant on a diplomatic level, the announcement was not apparently accompanied by any military moves by Russia threatening European security. And Moscow still maintains diplomatic relations with the individual governments in the alliance.
The decision will end a post-Cold War experiment, never very successful, in building trust between Russia and the Western alliance, established decades ago to contain the Soviet Union, which officials in Moscow accused of later encroaching on former Soviet territory.
By early next month, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, Russia will halt the activities of its representative office at NATO headquarters in Brussels and withdraw diplomatic credentials from emissaries of the alliance working in Moscow.
NATO’s response was muted. “We have taken note of the decision by Russia to suspend the work of its diplomatic mission,” a spokeswoman, Oana Lungescu, said. “NATO’s policy toward Russia remains consistent. We have strengthened our deterrence and defense in response to Russia’s aggressive actions, while at the same time we remain open to dialogue.”
The breakoff of diplomatic ties also comes as President Biden is seeking to strengthen the European alliance after former President Donald J. Trump denigrated members as freeloaders on American military spending and threatened to withdraw.
Relations between Moscow and the West have been strained for years, but the immediate impetus for the Russian move was a spy scandal.
Earlier this month, NATO ordered eight Russian diplomats to leave Belgium by Nov. 1, saying they were undeclared intelligence officers. The alliance also reduced the size of the Russian representative office.
In response, Mr. Lavrov said Russia’s entire diplomatic mission would leave by Nov. 1, or a few days after that date.
“Because of NATO’s targeted steps, proper conditions for elemental diplomatic activity don’t exist,” he said. “In response to NATO’s actions, we are halting the work of our permanent representation to NATO, including the work of the main military envoy.”
Relations with the alliance had in any case long ago gone off the rails, he said. NATO had already twice reduced the size of the Russian delegation, in 2015 and 2018, he said. “On the military level there are absolutely no contacts taking place,” he said.
He said NATO had set up a “prohibitive regime” for Russian diplomats in Brussels by banning them from its headquarters building. Without visiting the building, he said, they could not maintain ties with alliance officials.
Mr. Lavrov suggested the expulsions of Russian diplomats had come as an unwelcome surprise, as he had met in New York just days earlier with the alliance’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, and discussed de-escalating tensions.
“He in every way underscored the honest, as he said, interest in the North Atlantic alliance in normalizing relations with the Russian Federation,” Mr. Lavrov said.
NATO could still convey diplomatic messages to Russia’s embassy in Brussels, if necessary, Mr. Lavrov said.
In addition to diplomatic frictions, military tensions have also escalated in recent years, including last spring when Russian troops massed along Ukraine’s border, ostensibly for a military exercise.
In the immediate post-Cold War era, Russia had claimed a moral high ground in relations with NATO. Moscow, Russians noted, had dismantled its alliance of that era, the Warsaw Pact, while NATO in contrast expanded into former Soviet and East Bloc nations. Russia has since initiated new military alliances of its own, with former Soviet states and with China.
Relations were also strained by NATO’s intervention in the Balkan wars in the 1990s against Serbia, a Russian ally.
Russia responded, for a time, by dispatching an outspoken nationalist, Dmitry O. Rogozin, now the director of Russia’s space program, as its emissary to the alliance in Brussels, where he became a thorn in the side of NATO officials.
The problems simmered on. NATO’s view of Russia dimmed further after Russia intervened militarily in Ukraine in 2014. Ukraine is not a NATO member, but Russia’s aggressive moves there revived worries of an expansionist Kremlin agenda in Eastern Europe.
In announcing the halt to Russia’s diplomatic relations with NATO, Mr. Lavrov said Monday that the alliance didn’t show any interest in “equal dialogue or joint work.” He said there was no need to “go on pretending that in the foreseeable future anything will change.”
Monika Pronczuk contributed reporting.
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/31/world/europe/biden-putin-russia-united-states.html
Rivals on World Stage, Russia and U.S. Quietly Seek Areas of Accord
There have been a series of beneath-the-surface meetings between the two countries as the Biden administration applies a more sober approach to relations with the Kremlin.
MOSCOW — It might seem as if little has changed for Russia and the United States, two old adversaries seeking to undercut each other around the world.
Russian nuclear-capable missiles have been spotted on the move near Ukraine, and the Kremlin has signaled the possibility of a new intervention there. It has tested hypersonic cruise missiles that skirt American defenses and cut all ties with the American-led NATO alliance. After a summer pause, ransomware attacks emanating from Russian territory have resumed, and this past week, Microsoft revealed a new Russian cybersurveillance campaign.
Since President Biden took office nine months ago, the United States has imposed sweeping new sanctions on Russia, continued to arm and train Ukraine’s military and threatened retaliatory cyberattacks against Russian targets. The American Embassy in Moscow has virtually stopped issuing visas.
As world leaders met at the Group of 20 summit this weekend in Rome, Mr. Biden did not even get the chance to hash things out with his Russian counterpart face to face because President Vladimir V. Putin, citing coronavirus concerns, attended the event remotely.
Yet beneath the surface brinkmanship, the two global rivals are now also doing something else: talking.
The summit between Mr. Biden and Mr. Putin in June in Geneva touched off a series of contacts between the two countries, including three trips to Moscow by senior Biden administration officials since July, and more meetings with Russian officials on neutral ground in Finland and Switzerland.
There is a serious conversation underway on arms control, the deepest in years. The White House’s top adviser for cyber and emerging technologies, Anne Neuberger, has engaged in a series of quiet, virtual meetings with her Kremlin counterpart. Several weeks ago — after an extensive debate inside the American intelligence community over how much to reveal — the United States turned over the names and other details of a few hackers actively launching attacks on America.
Now, one official said, the United States is waiting to see if the information results in arrests, a test of whether Mr. Putin was serious when he said he would facilitate a crackdown on ransomware and other cybercrime.
Officials in both countries say the flurry of talks has so far yielded little of substance but helps to prevent Russian-American tensions from spiraling out of control.
A senior administration official said the United States was “very cleareyed” about Mr. Putin and the Kremlin’s intentions but thinks it can work together on issues like arms control. The official noted that Russia had been closely aligned with the United States on restoring the Iran nuclear deal and, to a lesser degree, dealing with North Korea, but acknowledged that there were many other areas where the Russians “try to throw a wrench into the works.”
Mr. Biden’s measured approach has earned plaudits in Russia’s foreign policy establishment, which views the White House’s increased engagement as a sign that America is newly prepared to make deals.
“Biden understands the importance of a sober approach,” said Fyodor Lukyanov, a prominent Moscow foreign policy analyst who advises the Kremlin. “The most important thing that Biden understands is that he won’t change Russia. Russia is the way it is.”
For the White House, the talks are a way to try to head off geopolitical surprises that could derail Mr. Biden’s priorities — competition with China and a domestic agenda facing myriad challenges. For Mr. Putin, talks with the world’s richest and most powerful nation are a way to showcase Russia’s global influence — and burnish his domestic image as a guarantor of stability.
“What the Russians hate more than anything else is to be disregarded,” said Fiona Hill, who served as the top Russia expert in the National Security Council under President Donald J. Trump, before testifying against him in his first impeachment hearings. “Because they want to be a major player on the stage, and if we’re not paying that much attention to them they are going to find ways of grabbing our attention.”
For the United States, however, the outreach is fraught with risk, exposing the Biden administration to criticism that it is too willing to engage with a Putin-led Russia that continues to undermine American interests and repress dissent.
European officials worry Russia is playing hardball amid the region’s energy crisis, holding out for the approval of a new pipeline before delivering more gas. New footage, circulated on social media on Friday, showed missiles and other Russian weaponry on the move near Ukraine, raising speculation about the possibility of new Russian action against the country.
In the United States, it is the destructive nature of Russia’s cybercampaign that has officials particularly concerned. Microsoft’s disclosure of a new campaign to get into its cloud services and infiltrate thousands of American government, corporation and think tank networks made clear that Russia was ignoring the sanctions Mr. Biden issued after the Solar Winds hack in January.
But it also represented what now looks like a lasting change in Russian tactics, according to Dmitri Alperovitch, the chairman of the research group Silverado Policy Accelerator. He noted that the move to undermine America’s cyberspace infrastructure, rather than just hack into individual corporate or federal targets, was “a tactical direction shift, not a one-off operation.”
Russia has already found ways to use Mr. Biden’s desire for what the White House refers to as a more “stable and predictable” relationship to exact concessions from Washington.
When Victoria Nuland, a top State Department official, sought to visit Moscow for talks at the Kremlin recently, the Russian government did not immediately agree. Seen in Moscow as one of Washington’s most influential Russia hawks, Ms. Nuland was on a blacklist of people barred from entering the country.
But the Russians offered a deal. If Washington approved a visa for a top Russian diplomat who had been unable to enter the United States since 2019, then Ms. Nuland could come to Moscow. The Biden administration took the offer.
Ms. Nuland’s conversations in Moscow were described as wide ranging, but in the flurry of talks between the United States and Russia, there are clearly areas the Kremlin does not want to discuss: Russia’s crackdown on dissent and the treatment of the imprisoned opposition leader Aleksei A. Navalny have gone largely unaddressed, despite the disapproval that Mr. Biden voiced on the matter this year.
While Mr. Biden will not see Mr. Putin in person at the Group of 20 summit in Rome or at the Glasgow climate summit, Dmitri S. Peskov, Mr. Putin’s spokesman, said in October that another meeting this year “in one format or another” between the two presidents was “quite realistic.”
“Biden has been very successful in his signaling toward Russia,” said Kadri Liik, a Russia specialist at the European Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin. “What Russia wants is the great power privilege to break rules. But for that, you need rules to be there. And like it or not the United States is still an important player among the world’s rule setters."
The most notable talks between Russian and American officials have been on what the two call “strategic stability” — a phrase that encompasses traditional arms control and the concerns that new technology, including the use of artificial intelligence to command weapons systems, could lead to accidental war or reduce the decision time for leaders to avoid conflict. Wendy Sherman, the deputy secretary of state, has led a delegation on those issues, and American officials describe them as a “bright spot” in the relationship.
Working groups have been set up, including one that will discuss “novel weapons” like Russia’s Poseidon, an autonomous nuclear torpedo.
While Pentagon officials say that China’s nuclear modernization is their main long-term threat, Russia remains the immediate challenge. “Russia is still the most imminent threat, simply because they have 1,550 deployed nuclear weapons,” Gen. John E. Hyten, who will retire in a few weeks as the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters on Thursday
In other contacts, John F. Kerry, Mr. Biden’s climate envoy, spent four days in Moscow in July. And Robert Malley, the special envoy for Iran, held talks in Moscow in September.
Aleksei Overchuk, a Russian deputy prime minister, met with Ms. Sherman and Jake Sullivan, Mr. Biden’s national security adviser — talks that Mr. Overchuk described as “very good and honest” in comments to Russian news media.
Mr. Putin, finely attuned to the subtleties of diplomatic messaging after more than 20 years in power, welcomes such gestures of respect. Analysts noted that he recently also sent his own signal: Asked by an Iranian guest at a conference in October whether Mr. Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan heralded the decline of American power, Mr. Putin countered by praising Mr. Biden’s decision and rejecting the notion that the chaotic departure would have a long-term effect on America’s image.
“Time will pass and everything will fall into place, without leading to any cardinal changes,” Mr. Putin said. “The country’s attractiveness doesn’t depend on this, but on its economic and military might.”
Anton Troianovski reported from Moscow, and David E. Sanger from Washington.
https://news.usni.org/2021/07/01/more-nato-ships-enter-black-sea-while-tensions-with-russia-simmer
More NATO Ships Enter Black Sea While Tensions With Russia Simmer
ITS Fasan, SNMG2 flagship cross under Istanbul strait on July 1, 2021. NATO Photo
The flagship of Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 entered the Black Sea on Thursday with two more alliance warships set to join the Sea Breeze exercises that started earlier this week, NATO announced.
Frigate ITS Virginio Fasan (F 591) passed through the Bosphorus headed for the Black Sea with a Turkish frigate and will join with a Romanian warship, according to ship spotters in Turkey.
“During [Fasan’s] deployment in the Black Sea, and after the joining of TCG Barbaros and ROS Regina Maria, SNMG2 will participate in bilateral U.S.-Ukraine exercise Sea Breeze,” reads a statement from NATO.
To date, NATO ships that have entered the Black Sea are the U.S. guided-missile destroyers USS Laboon (DDG-58) and USS Ross (DDG-71), French diving support ship FS Alizé A645, British guided-missile destroyer HMS Defender (D63), patrol vessel HMS Trent (P224) and the Dutch frigate HNLMS Evertsen (F805).
The recent ships’ transits into the Black Sea follow last week’s clashes between Russian military forces and Defender and Evertsen. While transiting the Black Sea off the coast of Crimea, Russian fighters and patrol vessels operated close to Defender while Russian forces warned the destroyer away from the vicinity of the coast, USNI News reported at the time.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2kG2R1GY0UI&ab_channel=USNINewsVideo
Earlier this week, images showing Russian fighters with anti-ship missiles flying over Evertsen in the Black Sea were released by the Dutch defense ministry. Dutch Defense minister Ank Bijleveld-Schouten called the Russian actions against Evertsen“irresponsible.”
“Evertsen has every right to sail there,” Bijleveld-Schouten said, according to SkyNews.
“There is no justification whatsoever for this kind of aggressive act, which also unnecessarily increases the chance of accidents.”
Earlier this week, when asked about the incidents on a television show, Russian president Vladimir Putin said the intent of the alliance ships in the Black Sea was to help establish U.S. bases in the region, according to a translation of the exchange by the BBC.
“They know they cannot win this conflict: we would be fighting for our own territory; we didn’t travel thousands of miles to get to their borders, they did,” he said.
The exercises and the Russian response come after unknown entities have falsified the automatic identification system (AIS) tracks for NATO warships to show them near the Russian-held territory of Crimea.
USNI News reported the automatic identification system (AIS) tracks of Defender and Evertsen were falsified on June 18 to show the warships off of the Russian naval base in Sevastopol in Crimea, while a track for USS Ross (DDG-71) was falsified on June 29 operating about 5 miles from the Crimean coast.
https://www.reuters.com/world/wide-disagreements-low-expectations-biden-putin-meet-2021-06-15/
Far apart at first summit, Biden and Putin agree to steps on cybersecurity, arms control
GENEVA, June 16 (Reuters) - U.S. President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed on Wednesday to begin cybersecurity and arms control talks at a summit that highlighted their discord on those issues, human rights and Ukraine.
In their first meeting since he took office in January, Biden asked Putin how he would feel if a ransomware attack hit Russia's oil network, a pointed question making reference to the May shutdown of a pipeline that caused disruptions and panic-buying along the U.S. East Coast.
While Biden stressed that he did not make threats during the three-hour meeting, he said he outlined U.S. interests, including cybersecurity, and made clear to Putin that the United States would respond if Russia infringed on those concerns.
Both men used careful pleasantries to describe their talks in a lakeside Swiss villa, with Putin calling them constructive and without hostility and Biden saying there was no substitute for face-to-face discussions.
They also agreed to send their ambassadors back to each other's capitals. Russia recalled its envoy after Biden said in March that he thought Putin was a "killer." The United States recalled its ambassador soon after.
Putin said on Wednesday that he had been satisfied by Biden’s explanation of the remark.
But there was no hiding their differences on issues such as human rights, where Biden said the consequences for Russia would be "devastating" if jailed Kremlin critic Alexei Navalny died, or cyberspace, where Washington has demanded Moscow crack down on ransomware attacks emanating from Russian soil.
"I looked at him and said: 'How would you feel if ransomware took on the pipelines from your oil fields?' He said: 'It would matter,'" Biden told reporters at an unusual solo news conference, itself an illustration of the tensions between the two nations.
The query referred to a cyberattack that closed the Colonial Pipeline Co (COLPI.UL) system for several days in May, preventing millions of barrels of gasoline, diesel and jet fuel from flowing to the East Coast from the Gulf Coast.
Biden also vowed to take action against any Russian cyberattacks: "I pointed out to him that we have significant cyber capability. And he knows it."
'THIS IS NOT ABOUT TRUST'
Speaking to reporters before Biden, Putin dismissed U.S. concerns about Navalny, Russia's increased military presence near Ukraine's eastern border and U.S. suggestions that Russians were responsible for the cyberattacks on the United States.
He also suggested Washington was in no position to lecture Moscow on rights, batting away question about his crackdown on political rivals by saying he was trying to avoid the "disorder" of a popular movement, such as Black Lives Matter.
"What we saw was disorder, disruption, violations of the law, etc. We feel sympathy for the United States of America, but we don’t want that to happen on our territory and we'll do our utmost in order to not allow it to happen,” he said.
He also seemed to question the legitimacy of arresting the rioters who attacked the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, seeking to stop Biden’s certification as president after he beat his predecessor, Donald Trump, in the November election by over 7 million votes.
U.S. President Joe Biden and Russia's President Vladimir Putin shake hands as they arrive for the U.S.-Russia summit at Villa La Grange in Geneva, Switzerland, June 16, 2021. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque
Biden said any comparison between what happened on Jan. 6 and the Black Lives Matter movement was “ridiculous.”
U.S.-Russia relations have been deteriorating for years, notably with Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, its 2015 intervention in Syria and U.S. charges - denied by Moscow - of meddling in the 2016 election won by Trump.
Neither side gave details on how their planned cybersecurity talks might unfold, although Biden said he told Putin that critical infrastructure should be “off-limits” to cyberattacks, saying that included 16 sectors that he did not publicly identify.
"We need some basic rules of the road that we can all abide by," Biden said he had told Putin.
Biden said he raised human rights issues because it was in the "DNA" of his country to do so, and also because of the fate of U.S. citizens jailed in Russia.
Putin said he believed some compromises could be found, although he gave no indication of any prisoner exchange deal.
Putin, 68, called Biden, 78, a constructive, experienced partner, and said they spoke "the same language." But he added that there had been no friendship, rather a pragmatic dialogue about their two countries' interests.
"President Biden has miscalculated who he is dealing with," said U.S. Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, who is close to Trump. He called it "disturbing" to hear Biden suggest that Putin cared about his standing in the world.
Trump was accused by both Democrats and some Republicans of not being tough enough on Putin, particularly during a jovial 2018 meeting in Helsinki between the two leaders.
This time, there were separate news conferences and no shared meal.
Both Biden and Putin said they shared a responsibility, however, for nuclear stability, and would hold talks on possible changes to their recently extended New START arms limitation treaty.
In February, Russia and the United States extended New START for five years. The treaty caps the number of strategic nuclear warheads they can deploy and limits the land- and submarine-based missiles and bombers to deliver them.
A senior U.S. official told reporters that Biden, Putin, their foreign ministers and interpreters met first for 93 minutes. After a break, the two sides met for 87 minutes in a larger group including their ambassadors.
Putin said it was "hard to say" if relations would improve, but that there was a "glimpse of hope."
“This is not about trust, this is about self-interest and verification of self-interest,” Biden said, but he also cited a “genuine prospect” of improving relations.
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/biden-putin-summit-russia-naval-exercise/
Ahead of Biden-Putin summit, Russia conducts what it calls its largest naval exercise in the Pacific since Cold War
The exercise includes surface ships, anti-submarine aircraft and long range bombers.
U.S. defense officials said that on Sunday, the U.S. scrambled F-22s from Hawaii in response to the bomber flights, but the bombers did not enter the Air Defense Identification Zone and were not intercepted.
At the same time, officials said a U.S. carrier strike group headed by the USS Vinson is operating about 200 miles east of Hawaii, conducting a strike group certification exercise. The exercise had been planned but was moved closer to Hawaii in response to the Russian exercise.
"U.S. Indo-Pacific Command is monitoring the Russian vessels operating in international waters in the Western Pacific," U.S. Indo-Pacific Command spokesman Captain Mike Kafka told CBS News in a statement.
"We operate in accordance with international law of the sea and in the air to ensure that all nations can do the same without fear or contest and in order to secure a free and open Indo-Pacific. As Russia operates within the region, it is expected to do so in accordance with international law."
Earlier this year, Russia built up tens of thousands of troops on the border with Ukraine as a part of what it called an exercise before reducing troops in late April after a month of buildup. The Pentagon called on Russia to be more transparent about troop movements during the buildup.
After meeting with NATO leaders on Monday, Mr. Biden indicated in a press conference that he will address the transparency of Russia's behavior in his meeting with Mr. Putin.
"I shared with our allies that I will convey to President Putin: That I'm not looking for conflict with Russia, but that we will respond if Russia continues its harmful activities and that we will not fail to defend the Transatlantic Alliance or stand up for democratic values," Mr. Biden said.
Putin warns of 'quick and tough' response to any provocation by the West
President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday sternly warned the West against encroaching further on Russia’s security interests, saying Moscow’s response will be “quick and tough” and make the culprits feel bitterly sorry for their action.
The warning during Putin’s annual state-of-the-nation address came amid a massive Russian military buildup near Ukraine, where cease-fire violations in the seven-year conflict between Russia-backed separatists and Ukrainian forces have escalated in recent weeks. The United States and its allies have urged the Kremlin to pull the troops back.
“I hope that no one dares to cross the red line in respect to Russia, and we will determine where it is in each specific case,” Putin said. “Those who organize any provocations threatening our core security interests will regret their deeds more than they regretted anything for a long time.”
Moscow has rejected Ukrainian and Western concerns about the troop buildup, saying it doesn’t threaten anyone and that Russia is free to deploy its forces on its territory. But the Kremlin also has warned Ukraine against trying to use force to retake control of the rebel-held east, saying Russia could be forced to intervene to protect civilians in the region.
“We really don’t want to burn the bridges,” Putin said. “But if some mistake our good intentions for indifference or weakness and intend to burn or even blow up those bridges themselves, Russia’s response will be asymmetrical, quick and tough."
00:31
Outrage over Navanly's treatment
As Putin spoke, a wave of protests started rolling across Russia’s far east in support of imprisoned opposition leader Alexei Navalny. The politician, who is Putin’s most persistent critic and was poisoned with a chemical nerve agent last year, started a hunger strike three weeks ago to protest what he said was inadequate medical treatment and officials’ refusal to allow his doctor to visit him.
Navalny’s treatment and deteriorating condition has caused international outrage and prompted his allies to call the nationwide protests. Police detained several Navalny associates in Moscow and moved to disperse unauthorized demonstrations across Russia, arresting scores.
In his speech, Putin pointed to Russia’s moves to modernize its nuclear arsenal and said the military would continue to build more state-of-the-art hypersonic missiles and other new weapons. He added that the development of the nuclear-armed Poseidon underwater drone and the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile is continuing successfully.
In an apparent reference to the U.S. and its allies, the Russian leader denounced those who impose “unlawful, politically motivated economic sanctions and crude attempts to enforce its will on others.” He said Russia has shown restraint and often refrained from responding to “openly boorish” actions by others.
The Biden administration last week imposed new sanctions on Russia for interfering in the 2020 U.S. presidential election and for involvement in the SolarWind hack of federal agencies — activities Moscow has denied. The U.S. ordered 10 Russian diplomats expelled, targeted dozens of companies and individuals, and imposed new curbs on Russia’s ability to borrow money.
Russia retaliated by ordering 10 U.S. diplomats to leave, blacklisting eight current and former U.S. officials, and tightening requirements for U.S. Embassy operations.
“Russia has its own interests, which we will defend in line with the international law,” Putin said during Wednesday’s address. “If somebody refuses to understand this obvious thing, is reluctant to conduct a dialogue and chooses a selfish and arrogant tone, Russia will always find a way to defend its position.”
'Bullying Russia' is a 'new sport'
In an emotional outburst, Putin chastised the West for acquiring a defiant stance toward Russia.
“Some countries have developed a nasty habit of bullying Russia for any reason or without any reason at all. It has become a new sport,” he said.
In an apparent reference to the U.S. allies, he compared them to Tabaqui, a cowardly golden jackal kowtowing to Shere Khan, the tiger in Rudyard Kipling’s “Jungle Book.” “They howl to please their lord,” he said.
Russia this week engaged in a tense tug-of-war with the Czech Republic, following Prague’s move to expel 18 Russian diplomats over a massive Czech ammunition depot explosion in 2014. Moscow has dismissed the Czech accusations of its involvement in the blast as absurd and retaliated by expelling 20 Czech diplomats.
Putin also harshly criticized the West for failing to condemn what he described as a botched coup attempt and a failed plot to assassinate Belarus’ President Alexander Lukashenko, allegedly involving a blockade of the country’s capital, power cuts and cyberattacks. Belarusian and Russian security agencies arrested the alleged coup plotters in Moscow earlier this month.
The practice of organizing coups and planning political assassinations of top officials goes over the top and crosses all boundaries,” Putin said, drawing parallels to plots against Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and the popular protests that led to the ouster of Ukraine’s former Russia-friendly president, Viktor Yanukovych, in 2014.Russia responded to Yanukovych’s ouster by annexing Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula and throwing its support to the separatists in the country’s east. Since then, fighting there has killed more than 14,000 people and devastated the industrial heartland.
Putin dedicated most of his annual address to domestic issues, hailing the nation’s response to the coronavirus pandemic. He said the quick development of three coronavirus vaccines underlined Russia’s technological and industrial potential. He called for a quicker pace of immunizations, voicing hope the country could achieve collective immunity this fall.
He put forward incentives to help the economy recover from the pandemic and promised new social payments focusing on families with children.
(AP)
Russia Bolsters Its Submarine Fleet, and Tensions With U.S. Rise
NAPLES, Italy — Russian attack submarines, the most in two decades, are prowling the coastlines of Scandinavia and Scotland, the Mediterranean Sea and the North Atlantic in what Western military officials say is a significantly increased presence aimed at contesting American and NATO undersea dominance.
Adm. Mark Ferguson, the United States Navy’s top commander in Europe, said last fall that the intensity of Russian submarine patrols had risen by almost 50 percent over the past year, citing public remarks by the Russian Navy chief, Adm. Viktor Chirkov. Analysts say that tempo has not changed since then.
The patrols are the most visible sign of a renewed interest in submarine warfare by President Vladimir V. Putin, whose government has spent billions of dollars for new classes of diesel and nuclear-powered attack submarines that are quieter, better armed and operated by more proficient crews than in the past.
The tensions are part of an expanding rivalry and military buildup, with echoes of the Cold War, between the United States and Russia. Moscow is projecting force not only in the North Atlantic but also in Syria and Ukraine and building up its nuclear arsenal and cyberwarfare capacities in what American military officials say is an attempt to prove its relevance after years of economic decline and retrenchment.
Independent American military analysts see the increased Russian submarine patrols as a legitimate challenge to the United States and NATO. Even short of tensions, there is the possibility of accidents and miscalculations. But whatever the threat, the Pentagon is also using the stepped-up Russian patrols as another argument for bigger budgets for submarines and anti-submarine warfare.
American naval officials say that in the short term, the growing number of Russian submarines, with their ability to shadow Western vessels and European coastlines, will require more ships, planes and subs to monitor them. In the long term, the Defense Department has proposed $8.1 billion over the next five years for “undersea capabilities,” including nine new Virginia-class attack submarines that can carry up to 40 Tomahawk cruise missiles, more than triple the capacity now.
“We’re back to the great powers competition,” Adm. John M. Richardson, the chief of naval operations, said in an interview.
Last week, unarmed Russian warplanes repeatedly buzzed a Navy destroyer in the Baltic Sea and at one point came within 30 feet of the warship, American officials said. Last year some of Russia’s new diesel submarines launched four cruise missiles at targets in Syria.
Mr. Putin’s military modernization program also includes new intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as aircraft, tanks and air defense systems.
To be sure, there is hardly parity between the Russian and American submarine fleets. Russia has about 45 attack submarines — about two dozen are nuclear-powered and 20 are diesel — which are designed to sink other submarines or ships, collect intelligence and conduct patrols. But Western naval analysts say that only about half of those are able to deploy at any given time. Most stay closer to home and maintain an operational tempo far below a Cold War peak.
Credit...Anatoly Maltsev/European Pressphoto Agency
The United States has 53 attack submarines, all nuclear-powered, as well as four other nuclear-powered submarines that carry cruise missiles and Special Operations forces. At any given time, roughly a third of America’s attack submarines are at sea, either on patrols or training, with the others undergoing maintenance. American Navy officials and Western analysts say that American attack submarines, which are made for speed, endurance and stealth to deploy far from American shores, remain superior to their Russian counterparts.
The Pentagon is also developing sophisticated technology to monitor encrypted communications from Russian submarines and new kinds of remotely controlled or autonomous vessels. Members of the NATO alliance, including Britain, Germany and Norway, are at the same time buying or considering buying new submarines in response to the Kremlin’s projection of force in the Baltic and Arctic.
But Moscow’s recently revised national security and maritime strategies emphasize the need for Russian maritime forces to project power and to have access to the broader Atlantic Ocean as well as the Arctic.
Russian submarines and spy ships now operate near the vital undersea cables that carry almost all global Internet communications, raising concerns among some American military and intelligence officials that the Russians could attack those lines in times of tension or conflict. Russia is also building an undersea unmanned drone capable of carrying a small, tactical nuclear weapon to use against harbors or coastal areas, American military and intelligence analysts said.
And, like the United States, Russia operates larger nuclear-powered submarines that carry long-range nuclear missiles and spend months at a time hiding in the depths of the ocean. Those submarines, although lethal, do not patrol like the attack submarines do, and do not pose the same degree of concern to American Naval officials.
Credit...Lev Fedoseyev/TASS, via Getty Images
Analysts say that Moscow’s continued investment in attack submarines is in contrast to the quality of many of Russia’s land and air forces that frayed in the post-Cold War era.
“In the Russian naval structure, submarines are the crown jewels for naval combat power,” said Magnus Nordenman, director of the Atlantic Council’s trans-Atlantic security initiative in Washington. “The U.S. and NATO haven’t focused on anti-submarine operations lately, and they’ve let that skill deteriorate.”
That has allowed for a rapid Russian resurgence, Western and American officials say, partly in response to what they say is Russia’s fear of being hemmed in.
“I don’t think many people understand the visceral way Russia views NATO and the European Union as an existential threat,” Admiral Ferguson said in an interview.
In Naples, at the headquarters of the United States Navy’s European operations, including the Sixth Fleet, commanders for the first time in decades are having to closely monitor Russian submarine movements through the maritime choke points separating Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom, the G.I.U.K. Gap, which during the Cold War were crucial to the defense of Europe.
Credit...Andrew Testa for The New York Times
That stretch of ocean, hundreds of miles wide, represented the line that Soviet naval forces would have had to cross to reach the Atlantic and to stop United States forces heading across the sea to reinforce America’s European allies in time of conflict.
American anti-submarine aircraft were stationed for decades at the Naval Air Station Keflavik in Iceland — in the middle of the gap — but they withdrew in 2006, years after the Cold War. The Navy after that relied on P-3 sub-hunter planes rotating periodically through the base.
Now, the Navy is poised to spend about $20 million to upgrade hangars and support sites at Keflavik to handle its new, more advanced P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft. That money is part of the Pentagon’s new $3.4 billion European Reassurance Initiative, a quadrupling of funds from last year to deploy heavy weapons, armored vehicles and other equipment to NATO countries in Central and Eastern Europe, to deter Russian aggression.
Navy officials express concern that more Russian submarine patrols will push out beyond the Atlantic into the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Russia has one Mediterranean port now, in Tartus, Syria, but Navy officials here say Moscow wants to establish others, perhaps in Cyprus, Egypt or even Libya.
“If you have a Russian nuclear attack submarine wandering around the Med, you want to track it,” said Dmitry Gorenburg, a Russian military specialist at the Center for Naval Analyses in Washington.
This month, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency christened a 132-foot prototype drone sea craft packed with sensors, the Sea Hunter, which is made with the intention of hunting autonomously for submarines and mines for up to three months at a time.
The allies are also holding half a dozen anti-submarine exercises this year, including a large drill scheduled later this spring called Dynamic Mongoose in the North Sea. The exercise is to include warships and submarines from Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and the United States.
“We are not quite back in a Cold War,” said James G. Stavridis, a retired admiral and the former supreme allied commander of NATO, who is now dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. “But I sure can see one from where we are standing.”
A map on April 21 with the continuation of an article about what Western military officials say is a significantly increased presence of Russian submarines along the coastlines of Scandinavia and Scotland, the Mediterranean Sea and the North Atlantic, meant to contest American and NATO undersea dominance, omitted two countries in NATO. Croatia and Luxembourg are also members.
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https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56746138
Russia to consider Biden plan for Putin summit
Image source, Getty Images Image caption, Russia's military has been conducting exercises in Crimea as well as near the border with eastern UkraineHours after US President Joe Biden proposed a summit with Russia's Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin has said it will study the idea.
"It is early to talk about this meeting in terms of specifics," said Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov.
Mr Biden made the proposal on the phone with Mr Putin, raising concerns about Russia's troop build-up on Ukraine's borders, the White House said.
The phone-call late on Tuesday was only the second conversation that President Biden has had with Russia's leader since he took office in January. Moscow recalled its ambassador for consultations last month after Mr Biden said he considered President Putin to be a "killer".
Mr Biden's predecessor, Donald Trump, met Mr Putin in Finland in 2018 and Finnish President Sauli Niinisto has reportedly offered to host a new summit.
Mr Niinisto's office said in a statement that he had a long call with the Russian leader on Tuesday evening and expressed concern about the troop build-up.
Mr Peskov said on Wednesday that "without doubt bilateral ties are important".
How significant is the troop build-up?
The US and European leaders have watched Russian military movements with increasing alarm. Ukraine's presidential spokeswoman, Yulia Mendel, said this week that Russia now had some 40,000 troops on the border with eastern Ukraine and a further 42,000 in Crimea, which was seized and then annexed by Russia in 2014.
Russian-backed separatists then took control of parts of eastern Ukraine in a conflict in which some 14,000 people have died, and clashes have flared up in recent weeks.
Until now Moscow has spoken of its troop movements as an internal affair, and Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said on Tuesday they were part of a three-week drill to test combat readiness. He accused Nato of moving troops near Russia's borders, which the Western military alliance has denied.
How has Nato responded?
Nato Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg called for an end to the "unjustified, unexplained and deeply concerning" military build-up, after talks in Brussels on Tuesday with US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken as well as Ukraine's foreign minister. Ukraine is not part of Nato but its president, Volodymyr Zelensky, is keen to join.
UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab has called on Russia to end "provocations" and de-escalate tensions.
Ukraine's military said it was conducting exercises near the Crimean peninsula in case of a Russian attack and the US is sending two warships to the Black Sea, which has prompted Russia's navy to move some of its fleet there from the Caspian Sea.
In a separate development, the Kremlin said Mr Putin's foreign policy adviser, Yuri Ushakov, had warned the US ambassador over any "unfriendly steps" Washington might take, such as imposing further sanctions.
Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with President Vladimir Putin of Russia
President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. spoke today with President Vladimir Putin of Russia. They discussed a number of regional and global issues, including the intent of the United States and Russia to pursue a strategic stability dialogue on a range of arms control and emerging security issues, building on the extension of the New START Treaty. President Biden also made clear that the United States will act firmly in defense of its national interests in response to Russia’s actions, such as cyber intrusions and election interference. President Biden emphasized the United States’ unwavering commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The President voiced our concerns over the sudden Russian military build-up in occupied Crimea and on Ukraine’s borders, and called on Russia to de-escalate tensions. President Biden reaffirmed his goal of building a stable and predictable relationship with Russia consistent with U.S. interests, and proposed a summit meeting in a third country in the coming months to discuss the full range of issues facing the United States and Russia.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/02/russia-ukraine-military-biden/
Russia’s Buildup Near Ukraine Puts Team Biden on Edge
Is Russia testing the waters or just testing Biden?
An Ukrainian soldier stands in position on the front line with Russia-backed separatists in Donetsk region on Feb. 19. Anatolii Stepanov/AFP via Getty Images
Russia is massing an unusual number of troops on the border with Ukraine, posing an early test for the Biden administration as it looks to repair relations with NATO allies and distinguish itself from former U.S. President Donald Trump’s controversial approach to relations with Moscow.
The buildup of forces on the Ukrainian border, along with hundreds of cease-fire violations in Ukraine’s eastern territories controlled by Russia-backed separatists, has alarmed NATO and sparked a flurry of phone calls between senior members of the Biden administration and their Ukrainian and Russian counterparts.
“They’re probing, they’re trying to see what we’re going to do, what NATO would do, what the Ukrainians would do,” said Jim Townsend, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO until 2017. “Is this a jumpy administration, or is this an administration that’s going to act with resolve? They’re doing all of these things to assess where the new administration is.”
President Joe Biden spoke to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on Friday, according to a Ukrainian readout, the first conversation between the two countries’ leaders since Trump’s ill-fated call in July 2019 with Zelensky that sparked his first impeachment investigation. “We stand shoulder to shoulder when it comes to preservation of our democracies,” the Ukrainian leader tweeted after the 50-minute conversation.
Envoys from the 30-member NATO alliance met on Thursday to discuss the matter and expressed concern about Russia’s large-scale military exercises and the uptick in cease-fire violations, a NATO official told Foreign Policy. “Russia’s destabilizing actions undermine efforts to de-escalate tensions,” the official said. “NATO continues to support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We remain vigilant and continue to monitor the situation closely.”
On Friday, the Kremlin warned that any deployment of NATO troops to Ukraine would escalate tensions further and prompt Russia to take additional measures to protect itself.
The conflict in eastern Ukraine between the country’s armed forces and Russia-backed separatists has periodically flared since a 2015 peace deal brought the worst of the fighting to an end. Observers of the conflict say the current escalation is of a different magnitude than previous scares.
Videos shared by Russian social media users, which are difficult to independently verify, appear to show trains and convoys of military vehicles streaming to the border with Ukraine and Crimea, the strategic Ukrainian peninsula on the Black Sea that Russia illegally annexed in 2014. Observers and experts are still trying to sort out Russian intentions behind the buildup, which appeared to outpace Moscow’s normal tempo for military exercises.
“[Russian President Vladimir Putin is] not so obvious when he pulls the big move. Why is he letting us see this?” said Townsend, the former Pentagon official.
Former U.S. officials saw this as a clear effort by Moscow to test the new Biden administration, which is still parsing policy reviews on how to craft a new strategy toward Russia after other escalations, including a massive hack on U.S. government agencies that Washington has blamed on the Kremlin.
“This could be a troop maneuver where they’re just testing to see how we react, it could be something military, or it could be where he parks people on the border,” a former senior Trump administration official told Foreign Policy. “They need to lay out publicly what the policy is. Further Russian incursions are not acceptable.”
The Crimea annexation in 2014 also started with a major snap military exercise along Russia’s western border with Ukraine, before masked men later poured into the Black Sea territory and overtook it.
Longtime observers of the conflict are skeptical that Russia is planning a renewed invasion of Ukraine, but they did not rule out the possibility entirely. “The thing about Vladimir Putin is that when we are thinking about what he is going to do, we are trying to think that it’s going to be something rational,” said Kirill Mikhailov, a researcher with the Conflict Intelligence Team, which tracks Russian military involvement in Ukraine. “He may have an entirely different view of the world, given that the information that he is getting is presumed to be highly curated.”
The Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer characterized this alternate worldview in comments to the BBC last month: “In the understanding of the Russian military, the West is waging hybrid war against Russia on many fronts: in Belarus, in Ukraine, with respect to Alexey Navalny,” he said.
Robert Lee, an expert on the Russian military and a Ph.D. candidate at King’s College London, said the moves were most likely intended to deter Ukraine from any future offensives in the region. “Russia is showing that they retain escalation dominance,” he said.
Zelensky has made a number of moves against Russian proxies in Ukraine, which some observers said may have factored into Moscow’s calculus. In February, the Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, a close Putin ally, was sanctioned by Kyiv, and three TV channels controlled by the magnate were shut down.
“It’s not about Medvedchuk as an individual,” said Michael Carpenter, who served as U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia during the Obama administration. “One of the main reasons why the Kremlin keeps these protracted conflicts percolating over time is precisely so that when its other levers of influence, whether they be oligarchs or corrupt politicians among neighboring countries, when they don’t deliver, they always have the option of turning up the heat on the conflict in order to gain influence in that way.”
Former U.S. officials also pointed to Putin’s desire to pressure Germany on multiple fronts, including the controversial construction of the undersea Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline that would bypass Ukraine and the Berlin-led Trilateral Contact Group that is tasked with ongoing cease-fire negotiations in eastern Ukraine.
But through Friday, the Ukrainian military continued going through its regular high-readiness training cycles, according to a source familiar with the preparations. Most assessments from the ground indicate that the Russians are conducting strategic posturing, but do not discount a sudden land grab, the source said. Ukraine could also move forward heavy equipment positioned in the west that is aimed at halting a Russian advance, including U.S.-made Javelin anti-tank missiles, which can rapidly be moved to the front lines under rules approved last year.
“The problem with the Russians is everything for them is a red line, and they bluster on everything, and when their position starts to collapse, they’ll backpedal,” a former senior U.S. defense official said. “The Ukrainians understand that better than anyone.”
The buildup comes amid a host of other escalatory activities by Moscow. “They have really brought out a continental-wide saber-rattling event,” said Ben Hodges, who was commanding general of U.S. Army Europe until 2017. Last Friday, the Russian defense ministry published a video of three Russian submarines punching up through ice in the Arctic, a difficult maneuver that Hodges said was a demonstration of capability in a region that has been subject to increasing military competition.
On Monday, NATO reported an “unusual peak” in Russian flights near the fringes of the alliance, with 10 flights being intercepted by NATO planes within a six-hour window. These events, combined with the buildup along the border with Ukraine, are “obviously not a coincidence,” Hodges said.
The tensions come as West-Russia relations have “hit the bottom,” according to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Moscow recalled its ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Antonov, after Biden agreed to a comment that Putin was a “killer” in a recent interview.
But the Biden administration intends to keep its diplomatic channel open to Moscow despite the spike in bilateral tensions. A State Department spokesperson told Foreign Policy that there are “no plans” to recall the U.S. ambassador to Moscow, John Sullivan, to Washington in response to Russia’s decision.
“We remain committed to open channels of communication with the Russian government, both to advance U.S. interests and reduce the risk of miscalculation between our countries,” the spokesperson said.
Even as tensions have increased in the last few days, former U.S. officials said Kyiv remains wary of escalating any conflict, potentially taking the bait from Moscow and allowing Russia-backed forces to further consolidate their gains in the east. Instead, Zelensky is likely to lean on the West, the person said.
“The Ukrainians are better off with a stalemate than escalating and getting their clock cleaned,” the former senior U.S. defense official said. “[Their] best play in the Donbass is international pressure and to wait Putin out. Plinking a few tanks with Javelins isn’t going to do much,” the official said, referring to Ukraine’s U.S.-supplied anti-tank Javelin missiles.
Amy Mackinnon is a national security and intelligence reporter at Foreign Policy. Twitter: @ak_mack
Jack Detsch is Foreign Policy’s Pentagon and national security reporter. Twitter: @JackDetsch
Robbie Gramer is a diplomacy and national security reporter at Foreign Policy. Twitter: @RobbieGramer
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/hmcs-calgary-china-sea-transit-1.5972098
Canadian warship transits South China Sea as diplomatic tensions remain high
HMCS Calgary passed near the disputed Spratly Islands, claimed by both China and the Philippines
The Department of National Defence says HMCS Calgary passed through the South China Sea while travelling from Brunei to Vietnam on Monday and Tuesday.
The passage did not go unnoticed by China, which shadowed the Canadian ship, according to a Defence official speaking on condition of anonymity.
China claims much of the sea as its territory and has been greatly expanding its military presence in the area. Many of those claims have been rejected by China's neighbours and several international rulings.
The Calgary's passage could aggravate tensions with Beijing, which has been engaged in a diplomatic dispute with Ottawa since Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou was arrested at the Vancouver airport in December 2018.
Beijing subsequently arrested two Canadians, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, in what the federal government and others have described as an act of retaliation in response to Meng's detention.
Meng is now facing possible extradition to the U.S. to face fraud allegations, while China has launched court proceedings against Kovrig and Spavor behind closed doors in recent weeks.
Department of National Defence spokesperson Daniel Le Bouthillier confirmed the Calgary passed near the disputed Spratly Islands — which both China and the Philippines claim and where the Chinese military has set up facilities and equipment.
Demonstrating support for allies
He said the South China Sea was the most practical route for the warship. Canadian officials have previously denied trying to send any message when warships have passed through waters claimed by China.
But documents obtained by The Canadian Press last year show such passages are often discussed at the highest levels of government before being approved.
One transit by HMCS Ottawa through the South China Sea's Taiwan Strait last year was described in the documents as having "demonstrated Canadian support for our closest partners and allies, regional security and the rules-based international order."
Defence officials were told to keep quiet about the Ottawa's trip in September 2019, three months after Chinese fighter jets buzzed two other Canadian ships making the same voyage.
https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/assessing-threats-us-vital-interests/russia
Key Topics
About the Index
Resources
Russia
Oct 20, 2021
Alexis Mrachek
Russia remains a formidable threat to the United States and its interests in Europe. From the Arctic to the Baltics, Ukraine, and the South Caucasus, and increasingly in the Mediterranean, Russia continues to foment instability in Europe. Despite economic problems, Russia continues to prioritize the rebuilding of its military and funding for its military operations abroad. Russia remains antagonistic to the United States both militarily and politically, and its efforts to undermine U.S. institutions and the NATO alliance continue without letup. In Europe, Russia uses its energy position, along with espionage, cyberattacks, and information warfare, to exploit vulnerabilities with the goal of dividing the transatlantic alliance and undermining faith in government and societal institutions.
Overall, Russia possesses significant conventional and nuclear capabilities and remains the principal threat to European security. Its aggressive stance in a number of theaters, including the Balkans, Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine, continues both to encourage destabilization and to threaten U.S. interests.
Military Capabilities. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS):
- Among the key weapons in Russia’s inventory are 336 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 2,840 main battle tanks, 5,220 armored infantry fighting vehicles, more than 6,100 armored personnel carriers, and more than 4,684 pieces of artillery.
- The navy has one aircraft carrier; 49 submarines (including 11 ballistic missile submarines); four cruisers; 11 destroyers; 15 frigates; and 125 patrol and coastal combatants.
- The air force has 1,160 combat-capable aircraft.
- The army has 280,000 soldiers.
- There is a total reserve force of 2,000,000 for all armed forces.1undefinedundefined
In addition, Russian deep-sea research vessels include converted ballistic missile submarines, which hold smaller auxiliary submarines that can operate on the ocean floor.2
To avoid political blowback from military deaths abroad, Russia has increasingly deployed paid private volunteer troops trained at Special Forces bases and often under the command of Russian Special Forces. It has used such volunteers in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine because they help the Kremlin “keep costs low and maintain a degree of deniability,” and “[a]ny personnel losses could be shrouded from unauthorized disclosure.”3
In February 2018, for example, at Deir al-Zour in eastern Syria, 500 pro-Assad forces and Russian mercenaries armed with Russian tanks, artillery, and mortars attacked U.S.-supported Kurdish forces.4
In January 2019, reports surfaced that 400 Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group were in Venezuela to bolster the regime of Nicolás Maduro.8
During the past few years, as the crisis has metastasized and protests against the Maduro regime have grown, Russia has begun to deploy troops and supplies to bolster Maduro’s security forces.10
In July 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law creating a National Guard with a total strength (both civilian and military) of 340,000, controlled directly by him.13
This deal likely directly resulted from the Belarusian protests that broke out in August 2020 following the fraudulent presidential election.
At first, the COVID-19 pandemic severely affected Russia’s economic growth.17
Because of the economic boost following the coronavirus lockdowns, Russia will likely find it easier to fund its military operations.
In 2020, Russia spent $61.7 billion on its military—5.23 percent less than it spent in 2019—but still remained one of the world’s top five nations in terms of defense spending.19
Much of Russia’s military expenditure is directed toward modernization of its armed forces. According to a July 2020 Congressional Research Service report, “Russia has undertaken extensive efforts to modernize and upgrade its armed forces” since its invasion of Georgia in 2008.20
In early 2018, Russia introduced its new State Armament Program 2018–2027, a $306 billion investment in new equipment and force modernization. However, according to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, “as inflation has eroded the value of the rouble since 2011, the new programme is less ambitious than its predecessor in real terms.”23
Russia has prioritized modernization of its nuclear capabilities and “claims to be 81 percent of the way through a modernization program to replace all Soviet-era missiles with newer types by the early 2020s on a less-than one-for-one basis.”24
The armed forces also continue to undergo process modernization, which was begun by Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov in 2008.28
In April 2020, the Kremlin stated that it had begun state trials for its T-14 Armata main battle tank in Syria.30
Russia’s fifth-generation Su-27 fighter fell short of expectations, particularly with regard to stealth capabilities. In May 2018, the government cancelled mass production of the Su-27 because of its high costs and limited capability advantages over upgraded fourth-generation fighters.33
In October 2018, Russia’s sole aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, was severely damaged when a dry dock sank and a crane fell, puncturing the deck and hull.35
Following years of delays, the Admiral Gorshkov stealth guided missile frigate was commissioned in July 2018. The second Admiral Gorshkov–class frigate, the Admiral Kasatonov,began sea trials in April 2019, but according to some analysts, tight budgets and the inability to procure parts from Ukrainian industry (importantly, gas turbine engines) make it difficult for Russia to build the two additional Admiral Gorshkov–class frigates as planned.39
Russia plans to procure eight Lider-class guided missile destroyers for its Northern and Pacific Fleets, but procurement has faced consistent delay.41
In November 2018, Russia sold three Admiral Grigorovich–class frigates to India. It is set to deliver at least two of the frigates to India by 2024.43
Russia’s naval modernization continues to prioritize submarines. In June 2020, the first Project 955A Borei-A ballistic-missile submarine, the Knyaz Vladimir, was delivered to the Russian Northern Fleet, an addition to the three original Project 955 Boreis.46
The Khaski-class submarines are planned fifth-generation stealth nuclear-powered submarines. They are slated to begin construction in 2023 and to be armed with Zircon hypersonic missiles, which have a reported speed of from Mach 5 to Mach 6.50
Russia also continues to upgrade its diesel electric Kilo-class subs.52
Transport remains a nagging problem, and Russia’s defense minister has stressed the paucity of transport vessels. According to a RAND report:
In 1992, just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation military had more than 500 transport aircraft of all types, which were capable of lifting 29,630 metric tons. By 2017, there were just over 100 available transport aircraft in the inventory, capable of lifting 6,240 metric tons, or approximately one-fifth of the 1992 capacity.55undefinedundefined
In 2017, Russia reportedly needed to purchase civilian cargo vessels and use icebreakers to transport troops and equipment to Syria at the beginning of major operations in support of the Assad regime.56
Although budget shortfalls have hampered modernization efforts overall, Russia continues to focus on development of such high-end systems as the S-500 surface-to-air missile system. As of March 2021, the Russian Ministry of Defense was considering the most fitting ways to introduce its new S-500 Prometheus surface-to-air missile system, which is able to detect targets at up to 1,200 miles, with its missile range maxing at approximately 250 miles, “as part of its wider air-defense modernization.” According to one report, the S-500 system will enter full service by 2025.57
Russia’s counterspace and countersatellite capabilities are formidable. A Defense Intelligence Agency report released in February 2019 summarized Russian capabilities:
[O]ver the last two decades, Moscow has been developing a suite of counterspace weapons capabilities, including EW [electronic warfare] to deny, degrade, and disrupt communications and navigation and DEW [directed energy weapons] to deny the use of space-based imagery. Russia is probably also building a ground-based missile capable of destroying satellites in orbit.58undefinedundefined
In December 2020, Russia tested a ballistic, anti-satellite missile built to target imagery and communications satellites in low Earth orbit.59
Military Exercises. Russian military exercises, especially snap exercises, are a source of serious concern because they have masked real military operations in the past. Their purpose is twofold: to project strength and to improve command and control. According to Air Force General Tod D. Wolters, Commander, U.S. European Command (EUCOM):
Russia employs a below-the-threshold of armed conflict strategy via proxies and intermediary forces in an attempt to weaken, divide, and intimidate our Allies and partners using a range of covert, difficult-to-attribute, and malign actions. These actions include information and cyber operations, election meddling, political subversion, economic intimidation, military sales, exercises, and the calculated use of force.61undefinedundefined
Exercises in the Baltic Sea in April 2018, a day after the leaders of the three Baltic nations met with President Donald Trump in Washington, were meant as a message. Russia stated twice in April that it planned to conduct three days of live-fire exercises in Latvia’s Exclusive Economic Zone, forcing a rerouting of commercial aviation as Latvia closed some of its airspace.62
Russia’s snap exercises are conducted with little or no warning and often involve thousands of troops and pieces of equipment.66
Snap exercises have been used for military campaigns as well. According to General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, former EUCOM Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, for example, “the annexation of Crimea took place in connection with a snap exercise by Russia.”69
Russia conducted its VOSTOK (“East”) strategic exercises, held primarily in the Eastern Military District, mainly in August and September of 2018 and purportedly with 300,000 troops, 1,000 aircraft, and 900 tanks taking part.71
One analyst described the extent of the exercise:
[T]he breadth of the exercise was impressive. It uniquely involved several major military districts, as troops from the Central Military District and the Northern Fleet confronted the Eastern Military District and the Pacific Fleet. After establishing communication links and organizing forces, live firing between September 13–17 [sic] included air strikes, air defence operations, ground manoeuvres and raids, sea assault and landings, coastal defence, and electronic warfare.73undefinedundefined
Chinese and Mongolian forces also took part, with China sending 3,200 soldiers from the People’s Liberation Army along with numerous pieces of equipment.74
Threats to the Homeland
Russia is the only state adversary in the Europe region that possesses the capability to threaten the U.S. homeland with both conventional and nonconventional means. Although there is no indication that Russia plans to use its capabilities against the United States absent a broader conflict involving America’s NATO allies, the plausible potential for such a scenario serves to sustain the strategic importance of those capabilities.
Russia’s 2021 National Security Strategy describes NATO as a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation:
Military dangers and military threats to the Russian Federation are intensified by attempts to exert military pressure on Russia, its allies and partners, the buildup of the military infrastructure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization near Russian borders, the intensification of reconnaissance activities, the development of the use of large military formations and nuclear weapons against the Russian Federation.76undefinedundefined
The same document also clearly states that Russia will use every means at its disposal to achieve its strategic goals:
[P]articular attention is paid to…improving the system of military planning in the Russian Federation, developing and implementing interrelated political, military, military-technical, diplomatic, economic, information and other measures aimed at preventing the use of military force against Russia and protecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity.77undefinedundefined
Strategic Nuclear Threat. Russia possesses the largest arsenal of nuclear weapons (including short-range nuclear weapons) among the nuclear powers. It is one of the few nations with the capability to destroy many targets in the U.S. homeland and in U.S.-allied nations as well as the capability to threaten and prevent free access to the commons by other nations.
Russia has both intercontinental-range and short-range ballistic missiles and a varied arsenal of nuclear weapons that can be delivered by sea, land, and air. It also is investing significant resources in modernizing its arsenal and maintaining the skills of its workforce, and modernization of the nuclear triad will remain a top priority under the new state armament program.78
Russia currently relies on its nuclear arsenal to ensure its invincibility against any enemy, intimidate European powers, and deter counters to its predatory behavior in its “near abroad,” primarily in Ukraine but also concerning the Baltic States.81
This arsenal serves both as a deterrent to large-scale attack and as a protective umbrella under which Russia can modernize its conventional forces at a deliberate pace, but Russia also needs a modern and flexible military to fight local wars such as those against Georgia in 2008 and the ongoing war against Ukraine that began in 2014.
Under Russian military doctrine, the use of nuclear weapons in conventional local and regional wars is seen as de-escalatory because it would cause an enemy to concede defeat. In May 2017, for example, a Russian parliamentarian threatened that nuclear weapons might be used if the U.S. or NATO were to move to retake Crimea or defend eastern Ukraine.82
General Wolters discussed the risks presented by Russia’s possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in his 2020 EUCOM posture statement:
Russia’s vast non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpile and apparent misperception they could gain advantage in crisis or conflict through its use is concerning. Russia continues to engage in disruptive behavior despite widespread international disapproval and continued economic sanctions, and continues to challenge the rules-based international order and violate its obligations under international agreements. The Kremlin employs coercion and aggressive actions amid growing signs of domestic unrest. These actions suggest Russian leadership may feel compelled to take greater risks to maintain power, counter Western influence, and seize opportunities to demonstrate a perception of great power status.83undefinedundefined
Russia has two strategies for nuclear deterrence. The first is based on a threat of massive launch-on-warning and retaliatory strikes to deter a nuclear attack; the second is based on a threat of limited demonstration and “de-escalation” nuclear strikes to deter or terminate a large-scale conventional war.84
Russia’s reliance on nuclear weapons is based partly on their small cost relative to the cost of conventional weapons, especially in terms of their effect, and on Russia’s inability to attract sufficient numbers of high-quality servicemembers. In other words, Russia sees its nuclear weapons as a way to offset the lower quantity and quality of its conventional forces.
Moscow has repeatedly threatened U.S. allies in Europe with nuclear deployments and even preemptive nuclear strikes.85
Russia continues to violate the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which bans the testing, production, and possession of intermediate-range missiles.87
In December 2018, in response to Russian violations, the U.S. declared Russia to be in material breach of the INF Treaty, a position with which NATO allies were in agreement.90
The sizable Russian nuclear arsenal remains the only threat to the existence of the U.S. homeland emanating from Europe and Eurasia. While the potential for use of this arsenal remains low, the fact that Russia continues to threaten Europe with nuclear attack demonstrates that it will continue to play a central strategic role in shaping both Moscow’s military and political thinking and the level of Russia’s aggressive behavior beyond its borders.
Threat of Regional War
Many U.S. allies regard Russia as a genuine threat. At times, this threat is of a military nature. At other times, it involves less conventional tactics such as cyberattacks, utilization of energy resources, and propaganda. Today, as in Imperial times, Russia uses both the pen and the sword to exert its influence. Organizations like the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), for example, embody Russia’s attempt to bind regional capitals to Moscow through a series of agreements and treaties.
Russia also uses espionage in ways that are damaging to U.S. interests. For example:
- In May 2016, a Russian spy was sentenced to prison for gathering intelligence for Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) while working as a banker in New York. The spy specifically transmitted intelligence on “potential U.S. sanctions against Russian banks and the United States’ efforts to develop alternative energy resources.”92undefinedundefined
The European External Action Service, diplomatic service of the European Union (EU), estimates that 200 Russian spies are operating in Brussels, which also is the headquarters of NATO.94
On March 4, 2018, Sergei Skripal, a former Russian GRU colonel who was convicted in 2006 of selling secrets to the United Kingdom and freed in a spy swap between the U.S. and Russia in 2010, and his daughter Yulia were poisoned with Novichok nerve agent by Russian security services in Salisbury, U.K. Hundreds of residents could have been contaminated, including a police officer who was exposed to the nerve agent after responding.96
On March 15, 2018, France, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S. issued a joint statement condemning Russia’s use of the nerve agent: “This use of a military-grade nerve agent, of a type developed by Russia, constitutes the first offensive use of a nerve agent in Europe since the Second World War.”98
Russian intelligence operatives are reportedly mapping U.S. telecommunications infrastructure around the United States, focusing especially on fiber-optic cables.100
- In March 2017, the U.S. charged four people, including two Russian intelligence officials, with directing hacks of user data involving Yahoo and Google accounts.101undefinedundefined
Russia has also used its relations with friendly nations—especially Nicaragua—for espionage purposes. In April 2017, Nicaragua began using a Russian-provided satellite station at Managua that, even though the Nicaraguan government denies it is intended for spying, is of concern to the U.S.104
Pressure on Central and Eastern Europe. Moscow poses a security challenge to members of NATO that border Russia. Although a conventional Russian attack against a NATO member is unlikely, primarily because it would trigger a NATO response, it cannot be entirely discounted. Russia continues to use cyberattacks, espionage, its significant share of the European energy market, and propaganda to sow discord among NATO member states and undermine the alliance. The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service’s International Security and Estonia 2019 report states clearly that “[t]he only serious threat to regional security, including the existence and sovereignty of Estonia and other Baltic Sea states, emanates from Russia. It involves not only asymmetrical, covert or political subversion, but also a potential military threat.”108
After decades of Russian domination, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe factor Russia into their military planning and foreign policy formulation in a way that is simply unimaginable in many Western European countries and North America. Estonia and Latvia have sizable ethnic Russian populations, and there is concern that Russia might exploit this as a pretext for aggression—a view that is not without merit in view of Moscow’s irredentist rhetoric and Russia’s use of this technique to annex Crimea.
According to Lithuania’s National Threat Assessment 2021, “It is almost certain that Russia’s policy of denying the sovereign choices of its neighbours will remain one of the most significant security threats in the Baltic Region in the future.”109
Latvian authorities describe the means used by Russia to claim that it is defending the rights of citizens or Russian compatriots in similar terms: TV propaganda to push discrediting messages about Latvia and stories in which the rights of Russian citizens are allegedly violated; “spreading interpretations of history favourable to Russia within Russia and abroad, as well as actively engaging in military-memorial work”; and the use of “compatriot support funds and other compatriot policy bodies” targeted at Latvian youth.111
Russia has also sought to undermine the statehood and legitimacy of the Baltic States. In January 2018, for example, Putin signed a decree renaming an air force regiment the “Tallinn Regiment” to “preserve holy historical military traditions” and “raise [the] spirit of military obligation.”112
In 2020, Russia used the COVID-19 pandemic to spread disinformation. In March, for example, various Russian state news sources reported that the U.S. initiated the coronavirus pandemic, that the U.S. deployed the virus as a “biological weapon,” or that the virus was a complete hoax created by the United States. Nor did Russia create this disinformation on its own; it relied on various theories created by China and Iran.114
In addition, Russia has sought to use disinformation to undermine NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in the Baltics. In April 2017, for example, Russian hackers planted a false story about U.S. troops being poisoned by mustard gas in Latvia on the Baltic News Service website.115
U.S. troops stationed in Poland for NATO’s eFP have been the target of similar Russian disinformation campaigns.117
Russia has also demonstrated a willingness to use military force to change the borders of modern Europe. When Kremlin-backed Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych failed to sign an Association Agreement with the EU in 2013, months of street demonstrations led to his ouster early in 2014. Russia responded by sending troops, aided by pro-Russian local militia, to occupy the Crimean Peninsula under the pretext of “protecting Russian people.” This led to Russia’s eventual annexation of Crimea, the first such forcible annexation of territory in Europe since the Second World War.121
Russia’s annexation of Crimea has effectively cut Ukraine’s coastline in half, and Russia has claimed rights to underwater resources off the Crimean Peninsula.122
Russia has deployed 28,000 troops to Crimea and has embarked on a major program to build housing, restore airfields, and install new radars there.126
These numbers may be larger now, given Russia’s military buildup in Ukraine in April 2021.129
Control of Crimea has allowed Russia to use the Black Sea as a platform to launch and support naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.131
Russia has deployed five S-400 air defense systems with a potential range of around 250 miles to Crimea.135
In eastern Ukraine, Russia has helped to foment and sustain a separatist movement. Backed, armed, and trained by Russia, separatist leaders in eastern Ukraine have declared the so-called Lugansk People’s Republic and Donetsk People’s Republic. Moscow has backed separatist factions in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine with advanced weapons, technical and financial assistance, and Russian conventional and special operations forces. Approximately 3,000 Russian soldiers are operating in the Donbas region of Ukraine.139
On November 25, 2018, Russian forces blocked the passage of three Ukrainian naval vessels through the Kerch Strait and opened fire on the ships before boarding and seizing them along with 24 Ukrainian sailors.142
In Moldova, Russia supports the breakaway enclave of Transnistria, where yet another frozen conflict festers to Moscow’s liking. According to a Congressional Research Service report:
Russia stations approximately 1,500 soldiers in Transnistria, a few hundred of which Moldova accepts as peacekeepers. In 2017, the Constitutional Court ruled that Russia’s troop presence in Moldova was unconstitutional, and parliament adopted a declaration calling on Russia to withdraw. In 2018, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution calling on Russia to withdraw its troops from Moldova “unconditionally and without further delay.”
A political settlement to the Transnistrian conflict appears distant. The Moldovan government supports a special local governance status for Transnistria, but Russia and authorities in Transnistria have resisted agreement.
The conflict-resolution process operates in a “5+2” format under the chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with the OSCE, Russia, and Ukraine as mediators and the EU and the United States as observers. The EU also supports conflict management through a Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM). EUBAM seeks to help the two countries combat transborder crime, facilitate trade, and resolve the conflict over Transnistria, which shares a long border with Ukraine.146undefinedundefined
Russia continues to occupy 12 percent of Moldova’s territory. In August 2018, Russian and separatist forces equipped with armored personnel carriers and armored reconnaissance vehicles exercised crossing the Dniester River in the demilitarized security zone. Moldovan authorities called the exercises “provocative,” and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to Moldova “expresse[d] its concern.”147
Russia’s permanent stationing of Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad in 2018 occurred a year to the day after NATO’s eFP deployed to Lithuania.149
Russia also has outfitted a missile brigade in Luga, Russia, a mere 74 miles from the Estonian city of Narva, with Iskander missiles.153
Nor is Russia deploying missiles only in Europe. In February 2018, Russia approved the deployment of warplanes to an airport on Iturup, one of the largest Kuril Islands.155
Russia has deployed additional troops and capabilities near its western borders. In May 2021, Russia announced plans to increase its troop presence along its western border “in response to what it views as an increasing threat from the United States and the NATO alliance.”159
According to a report published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs:
Five dedicated storage and maintenance bases have been established in the Western Military District, and another one in the Southern Military District (and a further 15 in the Central and Eastern districts). These, similar to the US Army’s POMCUS (Prepositioning Of Materiel Configured in Unit Sets), contain pre-positioned, properly maintained brigade-level assets, and 2.5 units of fire for all equipments.161undefinedundefined
Russia represents a real and potentially existential threat to NATO member countries in Eastern and Central Europe. Considering Russia’s aggression in Georgia and Ukraine, a conventional attack against a NATO member, while unlikely, cannot be ruled out entirely. In all likelihood, Russia will continue to use nonlinear means in an effort to pressure and undermine both these nations and the NATO alliance.
Militarization of the High North. Russia has a long history in the Arctic and, as an Arctic nation, has interests there. However, Russia’s ongoing militarization of the region, coupled with its bellicose behavior toward its neighbors, makes the Arctic a security concern.
Because nationalism is on the rise in Russia, Vladimir Putin’s Arctic strategy is popular among the population. For Putin, the Arctic is an area that allows Russia to flex its muscles without incurring any significant geopolitical risk.
Russia is also eager to promote its economic interests in the region. Half of the world’s Arctic territory and half of the Arctic region’s population are located in Russia. It is well known that the Arctic is home to large stockpiles of proven and yet unexploited oil and gas reserves. The majority of these reserves are thought to be located in Russia. In particular, Russia hopes that the Northern Sea Route (NSR) will become one of the world’s most important shipping lanes.
Russia has invested heavily in the Arctic region, opening a series of Arctic bases and investing in cold-weather equipment, coastal defense systems, underground storage facilities, and specialized training. Additionally, “Russian hardware in the High North area includes bombers and MiG31BM jets, and new radar systems close to the coast of Alaska.”162
Russia has also staged a series of statement activities in the Arctic. In 2007, Artur Chilingarov, then a member of the Russian Duma, led a submarine expedition to the North Pole and planted a Russian flag on the seabed. Later, he declared: “The Arctic is Russian.”163
In May 2017, Russia announced that its build-up of the Northern Fleet’s nuclear capacity is intended “to phase ‘NATO out of [the] Arctic.’”165
In addition to an ongoing strong naval presence in the Arctic, Russia often undertakes aggressive Arctic flights. In one instance in March 2017, nine Russian bombers simulated an attack on the U.S.-funded, Norwegian-run radar installation at Vardø, Norway, above the Arctic Circle.167
Although the Arctic region has been an area of low conflict among the Arctic powers, NATO should consider the implications of Russia’s recent aggressive military behavior. NATO is a collective security organization designed to defend the territorial integrity of its members. Five NATO members (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and the United States) are Arctic countries, and each has territory above the Arctic Circle. Two closely allied nations (Finland and Sweden) also have Arctic territory.
The U.S. in recent years has begun to pay increased attention to the Arctic theater in Europe. One way has been by maintaining an enhanced presence in Norway. In April 2021, the two nations signed the Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement, which in part allows the U.S. to build additional infrastructure at Rygge and Sola air stations in southern Norway as well as Evenes air station and Ramsund naval station above the Arctic Circle.170
Construction at Evenes will support Norwegian and allied maritime patrol aircraft in monitoring Russian submarine activity.
Because Russia is an Arctic power, its military presence in the region is to be expected, but it should be viewed with some caution because of Russia’s pattern of aggression. In the Arctic, sovereignty equals security. Respecting national sovereignty in the Arctic would ensure that the chances of armed conflict in the region remain low. Since NATO is an intergovernmental alliance of sovereign nation-states built on the consensus of all of its members, it has a role to play in Arctic security. In the words of NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg:
Increased Russian presence, more Russian bases in the High North, has also triggered the need for more NATO presence, and we have increased our presence there with more naval capabilities, presence in the air, and not least, the importance of protecting transatlantic undersea cables transmitting a lot of data.171undefinedundefined
In March 2017, a decree signed by Putin gave the Federal Security Service (FSB), which controls law enforcement along the Northern Sea Route, an Arctic shipping route linking Asia and Europe, additional powers to confiscate land “in areas with special objects for land use, and in the border areas.”172
The Russian National Guard, which reports to President Putin,174
In May 2018, Putin issued a presidential degree setting a target of 80 million tons shipped across the NSR by 2024.177
Russia also has been investing in military bases in the Arctic. Its base on Alexandra Land, commissioned in 2017, can house 150 soldiers autonomously for up to 18 months.180
In addition, old Soviet-era facilities have been reopened.
In September 2018, the Northern Fleet announced construction plans for a new military complex to house a 100-soldier garrison and anti-aircraft units at Tiksi; in January 2019, Russian authorities claimed that the base was 95 percent completed.181
Air power in the Arctic is increasingly important to Russia, which has 14 operational airfields in the region along with 16 deep-water ports.183
Russia resumed regular fighter jet combat patrols in the Arctic in 2019.186
Russian Arctic flights are often aggressive. In May 2017, 12 Russian aircraft simulated an attack against NATO naval forces taking part in the EASTLANT 17 exercise near Tromsø, Norway, and later that month, Russian aircraft targeted aircraft from 12 nations, including the U.S., that took part in the Arctic Challenge 2017 exercise near Bodø.189
In 2017, Russia activated a new radar complex on Wrangel Island.192
In November 2019, Russia announced rocket firings in the Norwegian Sea 20 to 40 nautical miles from the Norwegian coast. The test firings, with little advance notice, were designed to send a message as they took place in an area through which NATO ships were sailing during the Trident Juncture exercise.195
Russia’s ultimate goal is encapsulated in a June 2019 study published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs:
Since the mid-2010s, the Kremlin has deployed substantive force and capabilities along the coast of its northern border in the AZRF [Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation]. Parts of the armed forces are now Arctic-capable, and have developed concepts of operations tailored to that environment. With the creation of OSK Sever [Joint Strategic Command North] in 2013, the Russian armed forces have been slowly reshaping their Arctic command structure. The Arctic forces are primarily focused on air and naval operations, with the aim of creating an integrated combined-arms force for the region.197undefinedundefined
For a few years, Russia was developing three new nuclear icebreakers, and in May 2019, it launched its third and final Arktika.198
Russia’s most recently released naval doctrine, from July 2017, cites the alleged “ambition of a range of states, and foremost the United States of America and its allies, to dominate the high seas, including in the Arctic, and to press for overwhelming superiority of their naval forces.”201
Russia’s Northern Fleet is also building newly refitted submarines, including a newly converted Belgorod nuclear-powered submarine that was launched in April 2019.203
Russia continues to develop and increase its military capabilities in the Arctic region. The likelihood of armed conflict remains low, but physical changes in the region mean that the posture of players will continue to evolve. It is clear that Russia intends to exert a dominant influence. According to a U.S. Department of State official, as quoted in a Congressional Research Service report:
[The U.S. has] concerns about Russia’s military buildup in the Arctic. Its presence has grown dramatically in recent years with the establishments of new Arctic commands, new Arctic brigades, refurbished airfields and other infrastructure, deep water ports, new military bases along its Arctic coastline, an effort to establish air defense and coastal missile systems, early warning radars, and a variety of other things along the Arctic coastline. We’ve seen an enhanced ops [operations] tempo of the Russian military in the Arctic, including last October one of the largest Russian military exercises in the Arctic since the end of the Cold War. So there is some genuine and legitimate concern there on the part of the United States and our allies and partners about that behavior in the Arctic.208undefinedundefined
Destabilization in the South Caucasus. The South Caucasus sits at a crucial geographical and cultural crossroads and has been strategically important, both militarily and economically, for centuries. Although the countries in the region (Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan) are not part of NATO and therefore do not receive a security guarantee from the United States, they have participated to varying degrees in NATO and U.S.-led operations. This is especially true of Georgia, which aspires to join NATO.
Russia views the South Caucasus as part of its natural sphere of influence and stands ready to exert its influence by force if necessary. In August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, coming as close as 15 miles to the capital city of Tbilisi. A decade later, several thousand Russian troops occupied the two Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Russia has sought to deepen its relationship with the two occupied regions. In 2015, it signed so-called integration treaties with South Ossetia and Abkhazia that, among other things, call for a coordinated foreign policy, creation of a common security and defense space, and implementation of a streamlined process for Abkhazians and South Ossetians to receive Russian citizenship.209
both of which are still internationally recognized as part of Georgia.
In January 2018, Russia ratified an agreement with the de facto leaders of South Ossetia to create a joint military force—an agreement that the U.S. condemned.211
Today, Moscow continues to exploit ethnic divisions and tensions in the South Caucasus to advance pro-Russian policies that are often at odds with America’s or NATO’s goals in the region, but Russia’s influence is not restricted to soft power. In the South Caucasus, the coin of the realm is military might. It is a dangerous neighborhood surrounded by instability and insecurity reflected in terrorism, religious fanaticism, centuries-old sectarian divides, and competition for natural resources.
Russia maintains a sizable military presence in Armenia based on an agreement that gives Moscow access to bases in that country until at least 2044.215
Another source of regional instability is the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict, which began in 1988 when Armenia made territorial claims to Azerbaijan’s Nagorno–Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.219
The conflict ended on November 9, 2020, when Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a Russian-brokered cease-fire agreement.221
The Nagorno–Karabakh conflict offers another opportunity for Russia to exert malign influence and consolidate power in the region. While its sympathies lie with Armenia, Russia is the largest supplier of weapons to both Armenia and Azerbaijan.223
The South Caucasus might seem distant to many American policymakers, but the spillover effect of ongoing conflict in the region can have a direct impact both on U.S. interests and on the security of America’s partners, as well as on Turkey and other countries that depend on oil and gas transiting the region. Russia views the South Caucasus as a vital theater and uses a multitude of tools that include military aggression, economic pressure, and the stoking of ethnic tensions to exert influence and control, usually to promote outcomes that are at odds with U.S. interests.
Increased Activity in the Mediterranean. Russia has had a military presence in Syria for decades, but in September 2015, it became the decisive actor in Syria’s ongoing civil war, having saved Bashar al-Assad from being overthrown and having strengthened his hand militarily, thus enabling government forces to retake territory lost during the war. Although conflicting strategic interests cause the relationship between Assad and Putin to be strained at times, Assad still needs Russian military support to take back Idlib province, a goal that he likely shares with Putin.225
Russia’s Hmeymim Air Base is closely located to Idlib, a source of attacks from rebel fighters and terrorist groups, and Moscow instinctively desires to protect its assets. Assad’s only goal is to restore sovereignty over all of Syria; Russia generally is more focused on eliminating terrorism in the region and must manage its relationship with Turkey.
In January 2017, Russia signed an agreement with the Assad regime to “expand the Tartus naval facility, Russia’s only naval foothold in the Mediterranean, and grant Russian warships access to Syrian waters and ports…. The agreement will last for 49 years and could be prolonged further.”226
The agreement with Syria also includes upgrades to the Hmeymim air base at Latakia, including repairs to a second runway.229
Russia is using Syria as a testing ground for new weapons systems while obtaining valuable combat experience for its troops. According to Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, former Commander, U.S. Army Europe, Russia has used its intervention in Syria as a “live-fire training opportunity.”234
In fact, Russia has tested hundreds of pieces of new equipment in Syria. In December 2018:
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yury Borisov detailed to local media…the various new weapons systems [that] have been introduced to the conflict. These included the Pantsir S1 anti-aircraft and Iskander-M ballistic missile systems on the ground, Tupolev Tu-160 supersonic strategic bombers, Tu-22M3 supersonic bombers and Tu-95 propeller-driven bombers, as well as Mikoyan MiG-29K fighters and Ka-52K Katran helicopters in the air.236undefinedundefined
Overall, Russian arms sales abroad reportedly exceeded $13 billion in 2019, surpassing sales in 2018 by more than $2 billion.237
Russian pilots have occasionally acted dangerously in the skies over Syria. In May 2017, for example, a Russian fighter jet intercepted a U.S. KC-10 tanker, performing a barrel roll over the top of the KC-10.238
The U.S. and Russia have a deconfliction hotline to avoid midair collisions and incidents, but incidents have occurred on the ground as well as in the air. In November 2018, Ambassador James Jeffrey, U.S. Special Representative for Syria Engagement, told news media that “American and Russian forces have clashed a dozen times in Syria—sometimes with exchanges of fire.”240
In October 2018, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi signed a strategic cooperation treaty with Russia.241
In Libya, Russia continues to support Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar with weapons and military advisers. According to the Department of Defense, Russia’s Wagner Group continues to be involved militarily in Libya.245
Russia has stepped up its military operations in the Mediterranean significantly, often harassing U.S. and allied vessels involved in operations against the Islamic State. In April 2020, for example, a U.S. Navy aircraft over the Mediterranean Sea was intercepted by a Russian Su-35 jet—the second time in four days that “Russian pilots made unsafe maneuvers while intercepting US aircraft.”247
From April–August 2017, the U.S. along with British, Dutch, and Spanish allies tracked the Krasnodar, a Kilo-class submarine, as it sailed from the Baltic Sea to a Russian base in occupied Crimea. The submarine stopped twice in the eastern Mediterranean to launch cruise missiles into Syria and conducted drills in the Baltic Sea and off the coast of Libya. This was one of the first times since the Cold War that the U.S. and NATO allies had tracked a Russian submarine during combat operations.249
Russia’s position in Syria, including its expanded area-access/area-denialcapabilities and increased warship and submarine presence, underscores the growing importance of the Mediterranean theater in ensuring Europe’s security.
The Balkans. Security has improved dramatically in the Balkans since the 1990s, but violence based on religious and ethnic differences remains an ongoing possibility. These tensions are exacerbated by sluggish economies, high unemployment, and political corruption.
Russia’s interests in the Western Balkans are at odds with the ongoing desire of the U.S. and its European allies to encourage closer ties between the region and the transatlantic community:
Russia seeks to sever the transatlantic bond forged with the Western Balkans…by sowing instability. Chiefly Russia has sought to inflame preexisting ethnic, historic, and religious tensions. Russian propaganda magnifies this toxic ethnic and religious messaging, fans public disillusionment with the West, as well as institutions inside the Balkan nations, and misinforms the public about Russia’s intentions and interests in the region.251undefinedundefined
Senior members of the Russian government have alleged that NATO enlargement in the Balkans is one of the biggest threats to Russia.252
In June 2017, Montenegro became NATO’s 29th member state, and in March 2020, North Macedonia became NATO’s 30th member state, both joining Albania and Croatia as NATO members in the Balkans.
Russia stands accused of being behind a failed plot to break into Montenegro’s parliament on election day in 2016, assassinate its former prime minister, and install a pro-Russian government. In May 2019, two Russian nationals, believed to be the masterminds behind the plot, were convicted in absentia along with 12 other individuals for organizing and carrying out the failed coup. The trial judge stated that the convicted Russians who organized the plot “knowingly tried to terrorize Montenegrins, attack others, threaten and hurt basic constitutional and social structures.”253
After Russia annexed Crimea, the Montenegrin government backed European sanctions against Moscow and even implemented its own sanctions. Nevertheless, Russia has significant economic influence in Montenegro and in 2015 sought unsuccessfully to gain access to Montenegrin ports for the Russian navy to refuel and perform maintenance. Russia was the largest investor in Montenegro until October 2020, when it was surpassed by China.254
North Macedonia’s accession to NATO was similarly targeted by Russia, which had warned the nation against joining the alliance and sought to derail the Prespa agreement that paved the way for membership by settling long-standing Greek objections to Macedonia’s name.255
Serbia in particular has long served as Russia’s foothold in the Balkans:
Russia’s influence in the Balkans centers on Serbia, a fellow religiously orthodox nation with whom it enjoys a close economic, political, and military relationship. Serbia and Russia have an agreement in place allowing Russian soldiers to be based at Niš airport in Serbia. The two countries signed a 15-year military cooperation agreement in 2013 that includes sharing of intelligence, officer exchanges, and joint military exercises. In October [2017], Russia gave Serbia six MiG-29 fighters (which while free, will require Serbia to spend $235 million to have them overhauled). Additionally, Russia plans to supply Serbia with helicopters, T-72 tanks, armored vehicles, and potentially even surface-to-air missile systems.258undefinedundefined
The so-called Russian–Serbian Humanitarian Center at Niš is “widely believed to be a Russian spy base” and is located “only 58 miles from NATO’s Kosovo Force mission based in Pristina.”259
In February 2020, Serbia purchased the Pantsir S1 air-defense system from Russia despite objections and potential sanctions from the United States.260
Serbia and Russia have signed a strategic partnership agreement that is focused on economic issues. Russia’s inward investment is focused on the transport and energy sectors. Except for those in the Commonwealth of Independent States, Serbia is the only country in Europe that has a free trade deal with Russia. In January 2019, Serbia and Russia signed 26 agreements relating to energy, railway construction, and strategic education cooperation.262
In a January 2019 state visit to Serbia, Vladimir Putin stated a desire for a free trade agreement between Serbia and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, to be signed by the end of the year. An agreement between the two countries was signed in October 2019 “following veiled warnings from the European Union.”263
However, Serbia still participates in military exercises far more often without Russia than with Russia. “In 2017,” for example, “Serbian forces participated in 2 joint exercises with Russia and Belarus but held 13 exercises with NATO members and 7 with U.S. units.”265
Like Russia, Serbia is a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. Additionally, Serbia has been part of the U.S. National Guard’s State Partnership Program, partnering with the State of Ohio since 2006.
Russia is also active in Bosnia and Herzegovina—specifically, the ethnically Serb Republika Srpska, one of two substate entities inside Bosnia and Herzegovina that emerged from that country’s civil war in the 1990s. Moscow knows that exploiting internal ethnic and religious divisions among the country’s Bosniak, Croat, and Serb populations is the easiest way to prevent Bosnia and Herzegovina from entering the transatlantic community.
Republika Srpska’s current unofficial leader, Milorad Dodik, has long advocated independence for the region and has enjoyed a very close relationship with the Kremlin. President Željka Cvijanović also claims that Republika Srpska will continue to maintain its partnership with Russia.266
In many ways, Russia’s relationship with Republika Srpska is akin to its relationship with Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia occupied regions: more like a relationship with another sovereign state than a relationship with a semiautonomous region inside Bosnia and Herzegovina. When Putin visited Serbia in October 2014, Dodik was treated like a head of state and invited to Belgrade to meet with him. In September 2016, Dodik was treated like a head of state on a visit to Moscow just days before a referendum that chose January 9 as Republika Srpska’s “statehood day,” a date filled with religious and ethnic symbolism for the Serbs.268
On January 9, 2020, Bosnian Serbs again held “statehood day.”271
Russia has cultivated strong ties with the security forces of Republika Srpska. Russian police take part in exchanges with the security forces, and Russian intelligence officers reportedly teach at the police academy and local university. On April 4, 2018, the Republika Srpska authorities opened a new $4 million training center “at the site of a former army barracks in Zaluzani, outside Banja Luka.” The site serves as the headquarters for “anti-terrorist units, logistics units, and a department to combat organized crime.”275
Russia does not want Kosovo to be seen as a successful nation pointed toward the West. Rather, it seeks to derail Kosovo’s efforts to integrate into the West, often by exploiting the Serbian minority’s grievances. In the most jarring example, in January 2017, a train traveling from Belgrade to Mitrovica, a heavily Serb town in Kosovo, was stopped at the Kosovar border. The Russian-made train was “painted in the colors of the Serbian flag and featured pictures of churches, monasteries, and medieval towns, as well as the words ‘Kosovo is Serbian’ in 21 languages.”276
The U.S. has invested heavily in the Balkans since the end of the Cold War. Tens of thousands of U.S. servicemembers have served in the Balkans, and the U.S. has spent billions of dollars in aid there, all in the hope of creating a secure and prosperous region that will someday be part of the transatlantic community.
The foremost external threat to the Balkans is Russia. Russia’s interests in the Balkans are at odds with the U.S. goal of encouraging the region to progress toward the transatlantic community. Russia seeks to sever the transatlantic bond forged with the Western Balkans by sowing instability and increasing its economic, political, and military footprint in the region.
Threats to the Commons
Other than cyberspace and (to some extent) airspace, the commons are relatively secure in the European region. Despite Russia’s periodic aggressive maneuvers near U.S. and NATO vessels—and with the significant exception of the Kerch Strait—this remains largely true with respect to the security of and free passage through shipping lanes. The maritime domain is heavily patrolled by the navies and coast guards of NATO and NATO partner countries, and except in remote areas in the Arctic Sea, search and rescue capabilities are readily available. Moreover, maritime-launched terrorism is not a significant problem, and piracy is virtually nonexistent.
Sea. In May 2018, 17 Russian fighter jets buzzed the HMS Duncan, which was serving as the flagship of Standing NATO Maritime Group Two (SNMG2), operating in the Black Sea. Commodore Mike Utley, who was leading SNMG2, stated that the ship was “probably the only maritime asset that has seen a raid of that magnitude in the last 25 years,” and then-British Defense Minister Gavin Williamson described the behavior as “brazen Russian hostility.”277
Russian threats to the maritime theater also include activity near undersea fiber-optic cables. In July 2019, a Russian submarine reportedly was trying to tap information flowing through undersea cables near Russia’s northern shore in the Barents Sea. The cables “carry 95 percent of daily worldwide communications” in addition to “financial transactions worth over $10 trillion a day.”279
Thus, any disruption would cause a catastrophic reduction in the flow of capital.
The Yantar, a mother ship to two Russian minisubmersibles, is often seen near undersea cables, which it is capable of tapping or cutting, and has been observed collecting intelligence near U.S. naval facilities, including the submarine base at Kings Bay, Georgia.280
Airspace. Russia has continued its provocative military flights near U.S. and European airspace over the past year. In April 2021, Lieutenant General David Krumm from Joint Base Elmendorf–Richardson, Alaska, revealed that during the past year, there was a large increase in Russian activity and the U.S. intercepted more than 60 Russian aircraft.282
In March and April 2019, the Royal Air Force scrambled fighters twice in five days to intercept Russian bombers flying near U.K. airspace off Scotland while the U.S., Australia, and 11 NATO allies were taking part in the Joint Warrior exercise in Scotland.285
Aggressive Russian flying has occurred near North American airspace as well. In January 2019, two U.S. F-22s and two Canadian CF-18 fighters scrambled when two Russian Tu-160 Blackjack bombers flew into Arctic airspace patrolled by the Royal Canadian Air Force.287
Russian flights have also targeted U.S. ally Japan. Twice in one day in June 2019, two Russian Tupolev Tu-95 bombers entered Japanese airspace—over Minamidaito Island east of Okinawa and over Hachijo Island southeast of Tokyo. Japan sent out fighter jets to warn them.288
The principal threat from Russian airspace incursions, however, remains near NATO territory in Eastern Europe, specifically in the Black Sea and Baltic regions. In the Black Sea region, in December 2020, Russia scrambled one of its Su-30 fighter jets to prevent U.S. and French reconnaissance planes from crossing the Russian border, even though they were flying over international waters.292
There have been several incidents involving Russian military aircraft flying in Europe without using their transponders. In April 2020, two maritime Tu-142 reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare planes flew over the Barents, Norwegian, and North Seas but had switched off their transponders. As a result, two Norwegian F-16s were scrambled to identify the planes.295
Russia’s violation of the sovereign airspace of NATO member states is a probing and antagonistic policy that is designed both to test the defense of the alliance and as practice for potential future conflicts. Similarly, Russia’s antagonistic behavior in international waters is a threat to freedom of the seas.
Russia’s reckless aerial activity in the region also remains a threat to civilian aircraft flying in European airspace. That the provocative and hazardous behavior of the Russian armed forces or Russian-sponsored groups poses a threat to civilian aircraft in Europe was amply demonstrated by the July 2014 downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, killing all 283 passengers and 15 crewmembers, over the skies of southeastern Ukraine.
Cyber. Russian cyber capabilities are sophisticated and active, regularly threatening economic, social, and political targets around the world. Even more, Moscow appears to be increasingly aggressive in its use of digital techniques, often employing only the slightest veneer of deniability in an effort to intimidate targets and openly defy international norms and organizations.
Russia clearly believes that these online operations will be essential to its domestic and foreign policy for the foreseeable future. As former Chief of the Russian General Staff General Yuri Baluyevsky has observed, “a victory in information warfare ‘can be much more important than victory in a classical military conflict, because it is bloodless, yet the impact is overwhelming and can paralyse all of the enemy state’s power structures.’”298
Russia continues to probe U.S. critical infrastructure. In January 2019, testifying before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, then-Director of National Intelligence Daniel R. Coats assessed that:
Russia has the ability to execute cyber attacks in the United States that generate localized, temporary disruptive effects on critical infrastructure—such as disrupting an electrical distribution network for at least a few hours—similar to those demonstrated in Ukraine in 2015 and 2016. Moscow is mapping our critical infrastructure with the long-term goal of being able to cause substantial damage.299undefinedundefined
Russia continued to conduct cyberattacks on government and private entities in 2020 and 2021. In December 2020, Russian hackers “broke into a range of key government networks, including in the Treasury and Commerce Departments, and had free access to their email systems.”300
In April 2021, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Russia for the SolarWinds hack. It also sanctioned 32 Russian “entities and individuals” who had carried out “Russian government-directed attempts to influence the 2020 U.S. presidential election, and other acts of disinformation and interference.”303
In May 2021, a Russia-based hacking group known as DarkSide launched a cyberattack against Colonial Pipeline, “the operator of one of the nation’s largest fuel pipelines.”304
However, the United States is not Russia’s only target. In February 2020, the U.S. and its key allies accused Russia’s main military intelligence agency, the GRU, of a broad cyberattack against the Republic of Georgia. According to The New York Times, the attack “took out websites and interrupted television broadcasts.”310
The attack was limited, but through its accusation, the U.S. sought to deter Moscow from intervening in the 2020 presidential election.
In April 2018 alone, Germany’s head of domestic intelligence accused Moscow of attacking his government’s computer networks, and the U.K.’s National Cyber Security Center warned that Russian hackers were targeting Britain’s critical infrastructure supply chains. Cyber activity continues to be a significant part of Russia’s efforts to manipulate and undermine democratic elections in Europe and elsewhere.
In addition to official intelligence and military cyber assets, Russia employs allied criminal organizations (so-called patriotic hackers) to help it engage in cyber aggression. Using these hackers gives Russia greater resources and can help to shield its true capabilities. Patriotic hackers also give the Russian government deniability when it is desired. In June 2017, for example, Putin stated that “[i]f they (hackers) are patriotically-minded, they start to make their own contribution to what they believe is the good fight against those who speak badly about Russia. Is that possible? Theoretically it is possible.”311
Russia’s cyber capabilities are advanced and of key importance in realizing the state’s strategic aims. Russia has used cyberattacks to further the reach and effectiveness of its propaganda and disinformation campaigns, and its ongoing cyberattacks against election processes in the U.S. and European countries are designed to undermine citizens’ belief in the veracity of electoral outcomes and erode support for democratic institutions in the longer term. Russia also has used cyberattacks to target physical infrastructure, including electrical grids, air traffic control, and gas distribution systems.
Russia’s increasingly bold use of cyber capabilities, coupled with their sophistication and Moscow’s willingness to use them aggressively, presents a serious challenge both to the U.S. and to its interests abroad.
Conclusion
Overall, the threat to the U.S. homeland originating from Europe remains low, but the threat to America’s interests and allies in the region remains significant. Behind this threat lies Russia. Although Russia has the military capability to harm and (in the case of its nuclear arsenal) to pose an existential threat to the U.S., it has not conclusively demonstrated the intent to do so.
The situation with respect to America’s allies in the region is different. Through NATO, the U.S. is obliged by treaty to come to the aid of the alliance’s European members. Russia continues its efforts to undermine the NATO alliance and presents an existential threat to U.S. allies in Eastern Europe. NATO has been the cornerstone of European security and stability ever since its creation in 1949, and it is in America’s interest to ensure that it maintains both the military capability and the political will to fulfill its treaty obligations.
While Russia is not the threat to U.S. global interests that the Soviet Union was during the Cold War, it does pose challenges to a range of America’s interests and those of its allies and friends closest to Russia’s borders. Russia possesses a full range of capabilities from ground forces to air, naval, space, and cyber. It still maintains the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, and although a strike on the U.S. is highly unlikely, the latent potential for such a strike still gives these weapons enough strategic value vis-à-vis America’s NATO allies and interests in Europe to ensure their continued relevance.
Russian provocations that are much less serious than any scenario involving a nuclear exchange pose the most serious challenge to American interests, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, the Arctic, the Balkans, and the South Caucasus. As the 2021 Worldwide Threat Assessment states:
Moscow will continue to employ a variety of tactics this year meant to undermine US influence, develop new international norms and partnerships, divide Western countries and weaken Western alliances, and demonstrate Russia’s ability to shape global events as a major player in a new multipolar international order. Russia will continue to develop its military, nuclear, space, cyber, and intelligence capabilities, while actively engaging abroad and leveraging its energy resources, to advance its agenda and undermine the United States.312undefinedundefined
For these reasons, the Index of U.S. Military Strength continues to assess the threat from Russia as “aggressive” and “formidable.”
Endnotes
- International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics (London: Routledge, 2021), pp. 164–217.
- Michael Birnbaum, “Russian Submarines Are Prowling Around Vital Undersea Cables. It’s Making NATO Nervous,” The Washington Post, December 22, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russian-submarines-are-prowling-around-vital-undersea-cables-its-making-nato-nervous/2017/12/22/d4c1f3da-e5d0-11e7-927a-e72eac1e73b6_story.html (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Paul Stronski, “Implausible Deniability: Russia’s Private Military Companies,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Commentary, June 2, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/02/implausible-deniability-russia-s-private-military-companies-pub-81954 (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Kimberly Marten, “The Puzzle of Russian Behavior in Deir al-Zour,” War on the Rocks, July 5, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/the-puzzle-of-russian-behavior-in-deir-al-zour/ (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “How a 4-Hour Battle Between Russian Mercenaries and U.S. Commandos Unfolded in Syria,” The New York Times, May 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/middleeast/american-commandos-russian-mercenaries-syria.html (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Maria Tsvetkova, “Russian Toll in Syria Battle Was 300 Killed and Wounded: Sources,” Reuters, February 15, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-casualtie/russian-toll-in-syria-battle-was-300-killed-and-wounded-sources-idUSKCN1FZ2DZ (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Luke Harding, “Lawsuit Targets Russian Mercenary Company over Role in Syria,” The Guardian, March 15, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/15/lawsuit-seeks-justice-for-suspected-russian-killing-of-syrian-detainee (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Maria Tsvetkova and Anton Zverev, “Exclusive: Kremlin-Linked Contractors Help Guard Venezuela’s Maduro—Sources,” Reuters, January 25, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-russia-exclusive/exclusive-kremlin-linked-contractors-help-guard-venezuelas-maduro-sources-idUSKCN1PJ22M (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Tom Balmforth, “Russia Sends Lavrov to Venezuela to ‘Counteract’ U.S. Sanctions,” Reuters, February 4, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-venezuela-lavrov/russia-sends-lavrov-to-venezuela-to-counteract-u-s-sanctions-idUSKBN1ZY19Q (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Reuters, “Russian Air Force Planes Land in Venezuela Carrying Troops: Reports,” March 24, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-idUSKCN1R50NB (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Andrew Osborn, “Russian Nuclear-Capable Bomber Aircraft Fly to Venezuela, Angering U.S.,” Reuters, December 11, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-russia-airforce/russian-nuclear-capable-bomber-aircraft-fly-to-venezuela-angering-u-s-idUSKBN1OA23L (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Daria Litvinova, “Russia in Venezuela: As Moscow Accuses U.S. of ‘Information War,’ What Is Putin’s Role in the Standoff?” CBS News, updated May 1, 2019, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-in-venezuela-why-vladimir-putin-backs-nicolas-maduro-in-standoff-with-donald-trump-us/ (accessed June 19, 2021).
- International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics (London: Routledge, 2017), p. 186.
- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Putin Creates National Guard Force,” July 4, 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-national-guard-dissent-riots/27836301.html (accessed June 19, 2021), and International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017, p. 169.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017, p. 186.
- Warsaw Institute, Russia Monitor, “Russia’s Rosgvardia Sets Foot in Belarus,” December 22, 2020, https://warsawinstitute.org/russias-rosgvardia-sets-foot-belarus/ (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Press release, “Russia’s Economy Loses Momentum amid COVID-19 Resurgence, Says New World Bank Report,” The World Bank, December 16, 2020, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/12/16/russias-economy-loses-momentum-amid-covid-19-resurgence-says-new-world-bank-report (accessed June 19, 2021).
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- Table 1, “The 40 Countries with the Highest Military Expenditure in 2020,” in Diego Lopes Da Silva, Nan Tian, and Alexandra Marksteiner, “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2020,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Fact Sheet, April 2021, p. 2, https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/fs_2104_milex_0.pdf (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Andrew S. Bowen, “Russian Armed Forces: Military Modernization and Reforms,” Congressional Research Service In Focus No. 11603, July 20, 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11603 (accessed June 19, 2021).
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- Table 5, “Russian Defence Expenditure as % of GDP,” in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, p. 174.
- Richard Connolly and Mathieu Boulègue, “Russia’s New State Armament Programme: Implications for the Russian Armed Forces and Military Capabilities to 2027,” Chatham House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs Research Paper, May 2018, p. 2, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-05-10-russia-state-armament-programme-connolly-boulegue-final.pdf (accessed June 24, 2021).
- Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2021,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 77, No. 2 (March 2021), p. 94, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2021.1885869?needAccess=true (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Maxim Starchak, “Year 2020 in Review: Results of Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Modernization,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 18, Issue 7 (January 13, 2021), https://jamestown.org/program/year-2020-in-review-results-of-russias-nuclear-weapons-modernization/ (accessed June 19, 2021), and Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia’s Most Powerful Intercontinental Ballistic Missile to Enter Service in 2021,” The Diplomat, March 30, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/russias-most-powerful-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-to-enter-service-in-2021/ (accessed June 19, 2021).
- “Russia’s Hypersonic Ballistic Missile and Laser System in Final Tests, Putin Says,” The Moscow Times, April 11, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/04/11/russias-hypersonic-ballistic-missile-laser-system-final-tests-putin-says-a65204 (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Starchak, “Year 2020 in Review: Results of Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Modernization.”
- International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017, p. 159.
- Tom Bowman, “U.S. Military Advantage over Russia and China ‘Eroding,’ Pentagon Says,” NPR, January 19, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/01/19/579088536/u-s-military-advantage-over-russia-and-china-eroding-says-pentagon (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Kyle Mizokami, “Russia Is Field Testing Its New Armata Tank in Syria,” Popular Mechanics, April 22, 2020, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a32228809/russia-armata-tank/ (accessed June 24, 2021).
- “Russia to Receive Advanced Armata Tanks in 2022,” The Moscow Times, March 4, 2021, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/03/04/russia-to-receive-advanced-armata-tanks-in-2022-a73149 (accessed June 19, 2021).
- International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, p. 170.
- Alex Lockie, “Russia Admits Defeat on Its ‘Stealth’ F-35 Killer by Canceling Mass Production of the Su-57 Fighter Jet,” Business Insider, July 12, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-admits-defeat-su-57-not-going-into-mass-production-2018-7 (accessed June 19, 2021).
- “Russian Fighter Jet Crashes Near Crimea, Pilot Missing,” The Moscow Times, March 26, 2020, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/03/26/russian-fighter-jet-crashes-near-crimea-pilot-missing-a69753 (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Ryan Pickrell, “Russia Is Talking About Scrapping Its Only Aircraft Carrier, Putting the Troubled Ship out of Its Misery,” Business Insider, April 8, 2019, https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-is-talking-about-scrapping-kuznetsov-its-only-aircraft-carrier-2019-4 (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Zahra Ullah, Darya Tarasova, and Brad Lendon, “Russia’s Only Aircraft Carrier Catches Fire; 1 Dead and 2 Missing,” CNN, updated December 12, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/12/europe/russian-carrier-fire-intl/index.html (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Benjamin Brimelow, “Russia’s Unlucky Aircraft Carrier Is Getting Ready for Its Return to Action,” Business Insider, April 19, 2021, https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-aircraft-carrier-kuznetsov-getting-ready-for-return-to-action-2021-4 (accessed June 19, 2021).
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- Ibid. and Xavier Vavasseur, “Project 22350 Gorshkov-Class Frigates to Join Russia’s Black Sea Fleet,” Naval News, April 2, 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/04/project-22350-gorshkov-class-frigates-to-join-russias-black-sea-fleet/ (accessed June 19, 2021).
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- Joseph Trevithick, “Russia Has Abandoned Its Massive Nuclear Destroyer and Supersized Frigate Programs,” The War Zone, April 21, 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/33099/russia-has-abandoned-its-massive-nuclear-destroyer-and-supersized-frigate-programs (accessed June 19, 2021).
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- Andrew Osborn, “Despite Putin’s Swagger, Russia Struggles to Modernize Its Navy,” Reuters, February 21, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-military-insight/despite-putins-swagger-russia-struggles-to-modernize-its-navy-idUSKCN1QA0U7 (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Philip, “India Gets Ukrainian Engines for Its Stealth Frigates, Sends Them to Shipbuilder in Russia.”
- International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, pp. 164 and 171.
- Sputnik, “Russia Could Go Beyond Planned Series of 10 Borei-Class Nuclear-Powered Subs, Government Says,” May 17, 2021, https://sputniknews.com/military/202105171082913306-russia-could-go-beyond-planned-series-of-10-borei-class-nuclear-powered-subs-government-says/ (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Dave Makichuk, “Russia’s Kalibr Missile Puts US on the Back-Heel,” Asia Times, March 12, 2021, https://asiatimes.com/2021/03/russias-kalibr-missile-puts-us-on-the-back-heel/ (accessed June 19, 2021).
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- Charlie Gao, “Russia’s Husky Class Submarine: Armed with Nuclear Torpedoes and Hypersonic Missiles?” The National Interest, The Buzz Blog, May 10, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russias-husky-class-submarine-armed-nuclear-torpedoes-25784 (accessed June 19, 2021), and Michael Peck, “Russia Wants to Arm Its New Husky-Class Submarines with Hypersonic Missiles,” The National Interest, The Buzz Blog, May 31, 2018, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russia-wants-arm-its-new-husky-class-submarines-hypersonic-26063 (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Gao, “Russia’s Husky Class Submarine: Armed with Nuclear Torpedoes and Hypersonic Missiles?”
- International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017, p. 174.
- Franz Stefan-Gady, “First Project 636.3 Kilo-Class Attack Sub to Enter Service with Russia’s Pacific Fleet This Month,” The Diplomat, November 22, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/first-project-636-3-kilo-class-attack-sub-to-enter-service-with-russias-pacific-fleet-this-month/ (accessed June 19, 2021), and International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, p. 171.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017, p. 174.
- Ben Connable, Abby Doll, Alyssa Demus, Dara Massicot, Clint Reach, Anthony Atler, William Mackenzie, Matthew Povlock, and Lauren Skrabala, Russia’s Limit of Advance: Analysis of Russian Ground Force Deployment Capabilities and Limitations, RAND Corporation, 2020, pp. xvii and 56, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2563.html (accessed June 19, 2021).
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- U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, released February 11, 2019, p. 23, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf (accessed June 4, 2021). For release date, see news release, “Defense Intelligence Agency Releases Report on Challenges to U.S. Security in Space,” Defense Intelligence Agency, February 11, 2019, https://www.dia.mil/news/articles/article-view/article/1754150/defense-intelligence-agency-releases-report-on-challenges-to-us-security-in-spa/ (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Official: Russian Missile Tests Expose Vulnerability of Low-Orbiting Satellites,” SpaceNews, December 16, 2020, https://spacenews.com/space-force-official-russian-missile-tests-expose-vulnerability-of-low-orbiting-satellites/ (accessed June 19, 2021).
- TASS, “Latest Voronezh Radars to Replace All Russian Existing Airspace Control Systems,” February 15, 2021, https://tass.com/defense/1256441 (accessed June 19, 2021).
- General Tod D. Wolters, United States Air Force, Commander, United States European Command, statement on EUCOM posture before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, February 25, 2020, p. 3, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wolters_02-25-20.pdf (accessed June 19, 2021). Emphasis in original.
- Olevs Nikers, “Russia’s Offshore ‘Missile Tests’: Psychologically Undermining the Economic Security of the Baltics,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 15, Issue 74 (May 15, 2018), https://jamestown.org/program/russias-offshore-missile-tests-psychologically-undermining-the-economic-security-of-the-baltics/ (accessed June 19, 2021), and Michael Birnbaum, “Russia Tests Missiles in the Baltic Sea, a Day After Baltic Leaders Met with Trump,” The Washington Post, April 4, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-tests-missiles-in-the-baltic-sea-a-day-after-baltic-leaders-met-with-trump/2018/04/04/0a35e222-380d-11e8-af3c-2123715f78df_story.html?utm_term=.8f8c10f97f62 (accessed June 19, 2021).
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- Nikers, “Russia’s Offshore ‘Missile Tests’: Psychologically Undermining the Economic Security of the Baltics,” and Birnbaum, “Russia Tests Missiles in the Baltic Sea, a Day After Baltic Leaders Met with Trump.”
- Osborne, “Russian Live Missile Tests Force Latvia to Close Airspace over Baltic Sea: ‘It’s Hard to Comprehend.’”
- Col. Tomasz K. Kowalik and Dominik P. Jankowski, “The Dangerous Tool of Russian Military Exercises,” Foreign Policy Association, Foreign Policy Blogs, June 7, 2017, https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2017/06/07/dangerous-tool-russian-military-exercises/ (accessed June 19, 2021). Article “originally published by [the] Center for European Policy Analysis.”
- Nike Ching, “Blinken Heads to Ukraine After Russia Sends 150K Troops to Border,” Voice of America, April 30, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/europe/blinken-heads-ukraine-after-russia-sends-150k-troops-border (accessed June 19, 2021), and Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russian Military Says Its Troops Back to Bases After Buildup,” Associated Press, April 29, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/world-news-moscow-ukraine-europe-russia-629232949b5253512a58ca6fef215af9 (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Dave Johnson, “VOSTOK 2018: Ten Years of Russian Strategic Exercises and Warfare Preparation,” NATO Review, December 20, 2018, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2018/Also-in-2018/vostok-2018-ten-years-of-russian-strategic-exercises-and-warfare-preparation-military-exercices/EN/index.htm (accessed June 19, 2021).
- U.S. Strategic Command, “Remarks by Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti at the 2016 Deterrence Symposium,” La Vista, Nebraska, July 27, 2016, http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Speeches/Article/986470/2016-deterrence-symposium/ (accessed June 19, 2021).
- International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017, p. 187.
- Andrew Higgins, “300,000 Troops and 900 Tanks: Russia’s Biggest Military Drills Since Cold War,” The New York Times, August 28, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/28/world/europe/russia-military-drills.html (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Ibid. and Johnson, “VOSTOK 2018: Ten Years of Russian Strategic Exercises and Warfare Preparation.”
- Mathieu Boulègue, “Russia’s Vostok Exercises Were Both Serious Planning and a Show,” Chatham House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, September 17, 2018, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/russia-s-vostok-exercises-were-both-serious-planning-and-show (accessed June 19, 2021). Also posted on IntelliBriefs, September 18, 2018, http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2018/09/russias-vostok-exercises-were-both.html (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Ibid. and Johnson, “VOSTOK 2018: Ten Years of Russian Strategic Exercises and Warfare Preparation.”
- Higgins, “300,000 Troops and 900 Tanks: Russia’s Biggest Military Drills Since Cold War,” and Sam LaGrone, “China Sent Uninvited Spy Ship to Russian Vostok 2018 Exercise Alongside Troops, Tanks,” U.S. Naval Institute News, September 17, 2018, https://news.usni.org/2018/09/17/china-sent-uninvited-spy-ship-russian-vostok-2018-exercise-alongside-troops-tanks (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Vladimir Putin, “On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation,” Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 400, Moscow, July 2, 2021, pp. 11–12, https://www.academia.edu/49526773/National_Security_Strategy_of_the_Russian_Federation_2021 (accessed July 20, 2021).
- Ibid., p. 12.
- Connolly and Boulègue, “Russia’s New State Armament Programme: Implications for the Russian Armed Forces and Military Capabilities to 2027,” p. 16.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017, p. 15.
- Kristensen and Korda, “Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2021,” p. 90.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017, p. 15.
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- State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania and Second Investigation Department Under the Ministry of National Defence, National Threat Assessment 2019, p. 22.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics (London: Routledge, 2020), p. 171.
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- Associated Press, “Russia Deploys Missiles to Pacific Islands Claimed by Japan,” December 1, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/international-news-world-war-ii-kuril-islands-japan-russia-15dbd41dba12496daaeb1b59e5244681 (accessed June 20, 2021).
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- Jason Lemon, “Russia Plans to Build up Troops near Western Border to Combat Increasing Threat from NATO,” Newsweek, May 31, 2021, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-plans-build-troops-near-western-border-combat-increasing-threat-nato-1596293 (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Roger McDermott, “Russia’s Armed Forces Strengthen Western Military District,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 17, Issue 91 (June 24, 2020), https://jamestown.org/program/russias-armed-forces-strengthen-western-military-district/ (accessed June 20, 2021).
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- Nick Paton Walsh, “Satellite Images Show Huge Russian Military Buildup in the Arctic,” CNN, updated April 5, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/05/europe/russia-arctic-nato-military-intl-cmd/index.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Tom Parfitt, “Russia Plants Flag on North Pole Seabed,” The Guardian, August 2, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/02/russia.arctic (accessed June 20, 2021).
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- Joseph Trevithick, “Three Russian Ballistic Missile Submarines Just Surfaced Through the Arctic Ice Together,“ The War Zone, March 26, 2021, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/39953/three-russian-ballistic-missile-submarines-just-surfaced-through-the-arctic-ice-together (accessed June 24, 2021).
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- International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020, p. 184.
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- In 1991, the Azerbaijan SSR Parliament dissolved the Nagorno–Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and divided the area among five rayons (administrative regions) in Azerbaijan.
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- Atlantic Council, Digital Forensic Research Lab, “#PutinAtWar: Russia Fortifies Air Base in Khmeimim,” November 11, 2018, https://medium.com/dfrlab/putinatwar-russia-fortifies-air-base-in-khmeimim-803f4cc07946 (accessed June 20, 2021).
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- International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2019: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics (London: Routledge, 2019), p. 168.
- Tom O’Connor, “Russia Is ‘Forcing’ U.S. Military Out of Syria and Testing New Weapons to Help, Reports Say,” Newsweek, December 17, 2018, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-forcing-us-out-syria-new-weapons-1262207 (accessed June 20, 2021).
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- Chad Garland, “US and Russian Forces Have Clashed Repeatedly in Syria, US Envoy Says,” Stars and Stripes, November 23, 2018, https://www.stripes.com/news/us-and-russian-forces-have-clashed-repeatedly-in-syria-us-envoy-says-1.557790 (accessed June 20, 2021).
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- Leonid Bershidsky, “Russia Re-Enacts the Great Game in the Balkans,” Bloomberg, corrected January 20, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-01-19/russia-re-enacts-the-great-game-in-the-balkans (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Andrew E. Cramer and Joseph Orovic, “Two Suspected Russian Agents Among 14 Convicted in Montenegro Coup Plot,” The New York Times, May 9, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/world/europe/montenegro-coup-plot-gru.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Samir Kajosevic, “China Replaces Russia as Largest Investor in Montenegro,” Balkan Insight, October 20, 2020, https://balkaninsight.com/2020/10/20/china-replaces-russia-as-largest-investor-in-montenegro/ (accessed June 20, 2021).
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- Ibid.
- Kochis, “A Roadmap for Strengthened Transatlantic Pathways in the Western Balkans,” p. 9.
- Ibid., p. 4.
- Dusan Stojanovic, “Another European Country Has Bought Russian Anti-Aircraft Weapons at Putin’s Suggestion—and over US Warnings,” Business Insider, February 24, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/more-russian-weapons-for-serbia-despite-us-sanction-threats-2020-2 (accessed June 20, 2021).
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- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “On Visit to Serbia, Putin Accuses Kosovo of ‘Illegally’ Setting up an Army,” January 17, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/ahead-of-high-level-visit-to-serbia-putin-blasts-west-s-role-in-balkans/29714843.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
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- Srpska Republika News Agency and N1 Sarajevo, “RS President: Republika Srpska Has Very Good Relations with Serbia and Russia,” N1, January 5, 2019, http://rs.n1info.com/English/NEWS/a449708/RS-President-Republika-Srpska-has-very-good-relations-with-Serbia-and-Russia.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Reuters, “Russia Backs Bosnia’s Integrity amid Serb Calls for Secession,” September 21, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bosnia-russia/russia-backs-bosnias-integrity-amid-serb-calls-for-secession-idUSKCN1M11Q4 (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Tensions Rise as Bosnian Serbs Vote in Banned Referendum,” updated September 25, 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/balkan-tensions-rise-as-bosnian-serbs-push-ahead-with-banned-referendum/28010813.html (accessed June 208, 2021), and Gordana Knezevic, “Russia’s Fingers in Bosnia’s Pie,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 28, 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-putin-republika-srpska-bosnia-dodik-referendum-statehood-day/28018362.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Zorica Ilic, “Russia’s Balkan Power Games on Show Ahead of Elections,” Deutsche Welle, October 6, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/russias-balkan-power-games-on-show-ahead-of-elections/a-45781149 (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Andrew Byrne, “Bosnian Serb Forces Take Part in Illegal ‘Statehood Day’ Parade,” Financial Times, January 9, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/5ffff694-d66f-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Talha Ozturk and Gorana Jakovljevic, “Bosnian Serbs Celebrate Statehood Day Defying Court Ban,” Anadolu Agency, January 9, 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/bosnian-serbs-celebrate-statehood-day-defying-court-ban/1698046# (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Thea Morrison, “Georgia’s Breakaway S.Ossetia Signs Agreements with Republika Srpska,” Georgia Today, January 11, 2018, http://georgiatoday.ge/news/8733/Georgia%E2%80%99s-Breakaway-S.Ossetia-Signs-Agreements-with-Republika-Srpska (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Gordana Knezevic, “Talk of Paramilitaries, Real or Imagined, Could Fuel Division,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 21, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/balkans-talk-of-paramilitaries-fuel-division/29055292.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Vera Mironova and Bogdan Zawadewicz, “Putin Is Building a Bosnian Paramilitary Force,” Foreign Policy, August 8, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/08/putin-is-building-a-bosnian-paramilitary-force/ (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Ibid.
- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Balkan Service, “Serbia Stops ‘Promo Train’ to Kosovo’s North,” January 14, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/28233304.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Christopher Woody, “‘Good Luck, Guys’: 17 Russian Jets Buzzed a British Destroyer and Left a Threatening Message Earlier This Year,” Business Insider, November 27, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/17-russian-jets-buzzed-a-british-destroyer-in-the-black-sea-2018-11 (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Reuters, “As Syria Tensions Surge, Russian Fighter Jet Buzzes French Warship in Breach of International Law,” The Japan Times, April 11, 2018, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/04/11/world/syria-tensions-surge-russian-fighter-jet-buzzes-french-warship-breah-international-law/#.Wx_gGIpKjcs (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Marcia Wendorf, “Both the U.S. and Russia Are Stalking the World’s Undersea Cables,” Interesting Engineering, August 16, 2019, https://interestingengineering.com/both-the-us-and-russia-are-stalking-the-worlds-undersea-cables (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Kyle Mizokami, “What Is a Russian Spy Ship Doing in the Eastern Mediterranean?” Popular Mechanics, September 19, 2017, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a28276/yantar-spy-ship-eastern-mediterranean/ (accessed June 20, 2021), and Deb Reichmann, “Russia May Be Targeting Undersea Internet Cables. Here’s Why That’s Bad,” Yahoo News, March 30, 2018, https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-may-targeting-undersea-internet-213130980.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Ryan Browne and Zachary Cohen, “Russian Spy Ship Spotted 100 Miles off North Carolina Coast,” CNN, updated January 22, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/22/politics/russia-spy-ship-us-coast/index.html?sr=twCNNp012218russia-spy-ship-us-coast0253PMStory&CNNPolitics=Tw (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Rachel S. Cohen, “Spike in Russian Aircraft Intercepts Straining Air Force Crews in Alaska, Three-Star Says,” Air Force Times, April 28, 2021, https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2021/04/28/spike-in-russian-aircraft-intercepts-straining-air-force-crews-in-alaska-three-star-says/ (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Ibid.
- Corey Dickstein, “US Jets Intercept Russian Bombers off Alaskan Coast for 14th Time this Year,” Stars and Stripes, October 20, 2020, https://www.stripes.com/news/air-force/us-jets-intercept-russian-bombers-off-alaskan-coast-for-14th-time-this-year-1.649318 (accessed June 20, 2021).
- BBC News, “RAF Lossiemouth Jets Scrambled to Russian Planes Twice in Five Days,” April 3, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-highlands-islands-47799660 (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Jelena Ćirić, “Russian Bombers Enter NATO Airspace Near Iceland,” Iceland Review, March 19, 2019, https://www.icelandreview.com/news/russian-bombers-enter-nato-airspace-near-iceland/ (accessed June 20, 2021), and Larissa Kyzer, “Russian Bombers Re-Enter NATO Airspace Near Iceland,” Iceland Review, March 29, 2019, https://www.icelandreview.com/news/russian-bombers-reenter-nato-airspace-near-iceland/ (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “U.S., Canadian Jets Scrambled to Escort Russian Bombers Away from North American Coastline,” January 27, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/us-canadian-jets-scramble-escort-russian-blackjack-bombers-away/29733515.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Carlos M. Vazquez II and Aya Ichihashi, “Russian Bombers Violated Japan’s Airspace Twice in One Day, Defense Ministry Says,” Stars and Stripes, June 21, 2019, https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/russian-bombers-violated-japan-s-airspace-twice-in-one-day-defense-ministry-says-1.586945 (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Franz-Stefan Gady, “Japan Scrambles Fighter Jets to Intercept Russian Military Reconnaissance Plane,” The Diplomat, March 29, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/japan-scrambles-fighter-jets-to-intercept-russian-military-reconnaissance-plane/ (accessed June 20, 2021), and Franz-Stefan Gady, “Japan Scrambles Fighter Jets to Intercept 2 Russian Military Aircraft,” The Diplomat, May 6, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/japan-scrambles-fighter-jets-to-intercept-2-russian-military-aircraft/ (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Franz-Stefan Gady, “Japan Intercepts 2 Russian Nuclear-Capable Fighter-Bombers,” The Diplomat, January 17, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/japan-intercepts-2-russian-nuclear-capable-fighter-bombers/ (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Gady, “Japan Scrambles Fighter Jets to Intercept 2 Russian Military Aircraft.”
- Reuters, “Russia Scrambles Fighter Jet to Escort NATO Planes over Black Sea,” The Jerusalem Post, December 7, 2020, https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/russia-scrambles-fighter-jet-to-escort-nato-planes-over-black-sea-651422 (accessed June 20, 2021).
- News release, “NATO Jets Intercept Russian Warplanes During Unusual Level of Air Activity,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last updated March 30, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_182897.htm (accessed June 20, 2021).
- News release, “NATO Fighter Jets Intercept Russian Military Aircraft over the Baltic Sea,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Air Command, April 21, 2021, https://ac.nato.int/archive/2021/20210420_Baltic_Intercepts (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Nilsen, “Russian Sub Hunters Worry Air Traffic Controllers. Norway Scrambled F-16s and F-35s.”
- Associated Press, “Russian Aircraft Violates Airspace of NATO Member Estonia,” ABC News, September 24, 2019, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/russian-aircraft-violates-airspace-nato-member-estonia-65818448 (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “NATO Says Russian Su-27 Escort Jets Had No Flight Plans, Turned off Transponders,” August 14, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-says-russian-su-27-escort-jets-had-no-flight-plans-turned-off-transponders/30109797.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
- BBC News, “Russian Military Admits Significant Cyber-War Efforts,” February 23, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39062663 (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” statement before the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, January 29, 2019, p. 6, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf (accessed June 20, 2021).
- David Sanger, “Russian Hackers Broke into Federal Agencies, U.S. Officials Suspect,” The New York Times, May 10, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/13/us/politics/russian-hackers-us-government-treasury-commerce.html?login=smartlock&auth=login-smartlock (accessed June 24, 2021).
- Ibid.
- David E. Sanger, Nicole Perlroth, and Eric Schmitt, “Scope of Russian Hacking Becomes Clear: Multiple U.S. Agencies Were Hit,” The New York Times, updated May 10, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/14/us/politics/russia-hack-nsa-homeland-security-pentagon.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
- “FACT SHEET: Imposing Costs for Harmful Foreign Activities by the Russian Government,” The White House, April 15, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/15/fact-sheet-imposing-costs-for-harmful-foreign-activities-by-the-russian-government/ (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Jenna McLaughlin, “Justice Department Recovers Majority of Colonial Pipeline Ransom: ‘We turned the tables on DarkSide,’” Yahoo News, June 7, 2021, https://news.yahoo.com/justice-department-recovers-majority-of-colonial-pipeline-ransom-we-turned-the-tables-on-dark-side-210611828.html (accessed June 20, 2021), and Michael Schwirtz and Nicole Perlroth, “DarkSide, Blamed for Gas Pipeline Attack, Says It Is Shutting Down,” The New York Times, updated June 8, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/business/darkside-pipeline-hack.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Matt Egan and Clare Duffy, “Colonial Pipeline Launches Restart After Six-Day Shutdown,” CNBC, updated May 12, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/12/business/colonial-pipeline-restart/index.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
- Ryan Browne, “Hackers Behind Colonial Pipeline Attack Reportedly Received $90 Million in Bitcoin Before Shutting Down,“ CNBC, May 18, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/18/colonial-pipeline-hackers-darkside-received-90-million-in-bitcoin.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
- News release, “Department of Justice Seizes $2.3 Million in Cryptocurrency Paid to the Ransomware Extortionists Darkside,” U.S. Department of Justice, June 7, 2021, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-seizes-23-million-cryptocurrency-paid-ransomware-extortionists-darkside (accessed June 19, 2021).
- BBC News, “JBS: FBI Says Russia-Linked Group Hacked Meat Supplier,” June 3, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-57338896 (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Brett Molina and Mike Snider, “JBS USA, World’s Largest Meat Supplier, Shuts Down 9 Beef Plants After Cyberattack; ‘Vast Majority’ of Plants to Open Wednesday,” USA Today, June 1, 2021, https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/shopping/2021/06/01/jbs-cyberattack-worlds-largest-meat-supplier-closes-5-beef-plants/7493850002/ (accessed June 19, 2021).
- David E. Sanger and Marc Santora, “U.S. and Allies Blame Russia for Cyberattack on Republic of Georgia,” The New York Times, updated February 21, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/world/europe/georgia-cyberattack-russia.html (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Denis Pinchuk, “Patriotic Russians May Have Staged Cyber Attacks on Own Initiative: Putin,” Reuters, June 1, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-economic-forum-putin-cyber-idUSKBN18S56Y (accessed June 19, 2021).
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” April 9, 2021, p. 9, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf (accessed June 19, 2021).
Contributors and Acknowledgments
Executive Summary of the 2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Introduction
Preface
